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On	September	27,	2006,	government	officials,	military	officers,	and	foreign	
policy	experts	from	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	(ROK	
or	South	Korea)	gathered	for	a	one-day	workshop	in	Tokyo,	Japan,	to	discuss	
the	threat	of	a	potential	pandemic	influenza	crisis	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	
Policy	makers	and	military	experts	shared	national	strategies	and	military	
response	plans	and	explored	options	for	augmenting	a	coordinated	regional	
response	to	a	possible	avian	flu	outbreak.	Participants	also	discussed	means	to	
leverage	existing	partnerships,	enhance	interoperability,	and	integrate	plan-
ning	efforts	in	order	to	minimize	the	health	and	economic	impact,	including	
related	security	challenges	and	social	implications,	of	a	pandemic	influenza	
contingency,	and	by	extension,	other	natural	disaster,	pandemic	disease,	or	
biohazard	events.
The	event,	Pandemic	Influenza	Workshop:	Multilateral	Perspec-
tives	on	Preparedness,	Response	Planning,	and	Areas	for	Cooperation,	was	
co-sponsored	by	the	Institute	for	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	(IFPA),	based	in	
Cambridge,	Massachusetts,	and	Washington,	D.C.,	the	Institute	of	World	
Studies	at	Takushoku	University,	located	in	Tokyo,	Japan,	and	United	States	
Pacific	Command	(PACOM),	based	in	Honolulu,	Hawaii.	IFPA	is	grateful	to	
all	of	the	workshop	speakers	and	participants	who	gave	their	valuable	time	
and	considerable	expertise	to	this	initiative.
Increasingly,	health	experts,	government	officials,	military	planners,	
and	regional	and	international	bodies	have	engaged	in	pandemic	influenza	
1	 	The	conclusions	of	this	report	do	not	necessarily	represent	the	opinions	of	all	of	the	
workshop	participants	or	their	organizations.	This	is	not	a	consensus	document,	nor	
have	the	participants	or	co-sponsoring	organizations	reviewed	it	prior	to	publication.	
IFPA	is	responsible	for	the	content	of	this	report.	
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preparedness	planning.	In	fact,	the	workshop	
coincided	with	the	first	meeting	of	the	World	
Health	Organization	Influenza	Pandemic	Task	
Force	(WHO	IPTF),	whose	membership	has	been	
assigned	to	advise	the	WHO	on	potential	public	
health	concerns	related	to	avian	and	pandemic	
influenza,	including	issues	such	as	definition	of	
the	phases	of	an	influenza	outbreak,	declaration	
of	an	influenza	pandemic,	and	suitable	interna-
tional	response	measures.	The	workshop	also	took	
place	a	few	months	after	the	Asia-Pacific	Economic	
Cooperation	(APEC)	ministerial	meeting	on	avian	
and	influenza	pandemics,	and	a	few	weeks	before	
a	three-day	tabletop	pandemic	influenza	exercise	
in	Seoul,	in	which	over	250	individuals	partici-
pated,	including	some	present	at	the	workshop	in	
Tokyo.	
The	 workshop	 agenda	 focused	 on	 the	
nature	of	a	potential	pandemic	influenza	crisis	in	
the	Asia-Pacific	theatre.	Participants	discussed	the	
necessary	emergency	planning	and	response	activi-
ties	of	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	South	Korea	in	
preparation	for	a	coordinated	regional	or	multilat-
eral	response	to	the	impending	crisis	(see	appendix	
B	for	a	detailed	workshop	agenda	and	appendix	C	
for	a	complete	list	of	workshop	participants).
The	first	session	of	the	workshop	briefly	
outlined	the	preparedness	activities	already	under	
development,	including	the	guidelines	and	recom-
mendations	of	the	WHO	for	prevention,	response	
planning,	surveillance,	and	containment.	Partici-
pants	also	highlighted	several	key	areas	that	require	
more	attention,	such	as	the	role	of	the	private	sec-
tor	in	disaster	response,	the	potential	disruption	
to	government	services	and	critical	infrastructure,	
the	threat	to	national	security,	the	limitations	of	
effective	health	treatments,	and	the	disturbing	gap	
between	the	capacity	of	developed	and	develop-
ing	countries	to	respond	to	an	avian	flu	outbreak.	
The	second	session	reviewed	the	national	strate-
gies	of	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	South	Korea,	
assessed	the	strengths	and	limitations	of	the	plan-
ning	efforts,	and	identified	areas	for	improvement,	
support,	and	cooperation,	such	as	bio-medical	sur-
veillance,	crisis	coordination,	and	antiviral	and	
vaccine	development	and	distribution.	Session	3	
examined	the	military	preparedness	plans	of	the	
three	countries	and	discussed	the	potential	role	
of	the	military	in	support	of	the	initial	response	
efforts	of	civilian	agencies	during	a	pandemic.	Mil-
itary	planners	also	shared	lessons	learned	from	past	
crisis	management	simulations,	tabletop	exercises,	
and	live	operations,	including	the	avian	influen-
za	outbreaks	among	poultry	in	Japan	and	South	
Korea,	as	well	as	the	military	response	to	the	Asian	
tsunami	disaster	in	December	2004.	Finally,	the	
fourth	session	focused	on	areas	of	enhanced	coop-
eration	and	planning,	identified	essential	tasks	and	
opportunities	for	government	and	military	coordi-
nation,	such	as	regional	crisis	coordination	centers,	
communication	networks,	future	joint	exercises,	
training,	and	follow-on	workshops	and	seminars.
Frank	and	spirited	discussion	following	
each	session	revealed	the	multiple	policy	priori-
ties	of	each	country.	All	participants	recognized	
that	policy	coordination,	including	military-to-
military	cooperation,	is	critical	to	combating	the	
emerging	threat	of	a	pandemic.	Specifically,	partic-
ipants	identified	areas	that	each	country’s	political	
and	military	leadership	could	focus	on	in	order	to	
improve	regional	and	multilateral	response	mech-
anisms	in	disaster	relief.	For	example,	participants	
agreed	that	periodic	tabletop	exercises	and	expert	
meetings	among	key	partners	from	the	government,	
military,	private	sector,	civil	society,	nonprofit	
organizations,	and	regional	and	multilateral	agen-
cies	will	help	identify	the	gaps	and	opportunities	
for	enhanced	cooperation,	as	well	as	specify	the	
chains	of	command	with	regard	to	notification	and	
communication.	Participants	also	acknowledged	
exercises	and	exchanges	should	include	other	key	
regional	players,	particularly	Australia	and	Singa-
pore.	
Despite	the	significant	expertise	of	the	
WHO,	participants	agreed	that	the	agency	was	
severely	underfunded	to	tackle	pandemic	influen-
za	alone.	Participants	addressed	various	initiatives	
to	support	WHO	efforts,	such	as	the	launch	of	a	Oeriew	|		The Pandemic Influenza Challenge	 
web-based	central	information	clearinghouse	to	fil-
ter	reports	and	provide	real-time	satellite	imagery	
on	avian	flu	incidents	worldwide.	Participants	also	
identified	measures	to	strengthen	regional	com-
munication	networks,	including	the	creation	of	
coordination	crisis	center.	Although	such	initia-
tives	were	well	received	at	the	workshop,	several	
participants	stressed	that	the	failure	to	promote	
local	 awareness	 and	 address	 the	 gap	 between	
the	ability	of	developed	nations	and	of	less	devel-
oped	nations	to	respond	to	an	influenza	pandemic	
renders	all	other	prevention	measures	practical-
ly	useless.	Moreover,	participants	acknowledged	
that	contingency	plans,	particularly	for	the	Unit-
ed	States,	Japan,	and	South	Korea,	should	address	
response	measures	for	isolated	countries	such	as	
North	Korea,	as	well	as	prepare	for	possible	terror-
ist	attacks	during	a	pandemic,	including	the	use	of	
the	H5N1	virus	as	the	weapon.	
The	pages	that	follow	offer	a	thorough	
review	of	the	nature	of	the	pandemic	influenza	
crisis	that	threatens	to	emerge	and	summarize	the	
international	efforts	undertaken	thus	far	to	combat	
this	threat,	specifically	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	
Insights	gained	from	the	workshop	sessions	and	
group	discussions	have	been	integrated	into	the	
workshop	summaries	in	this	research	report.	The	
data	referenced	in	this	report	is	based	on	informa-
tion	publicly	available	as	of	December	2006.	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge
It	is	only	a	matter	of	time	before	an	avian	flu	virus	-	most	
likely	H5N1	-	acquires	the	ability	to	be	transmitted	from	
human	to	human,	sparking	the	outbreak	of	human	pandem-
ic	influenza.	We	don’t	know	when	this	will	happen.	But	we	
do	know	that	it	will	happen.	This	is	the	time	to	build	glob-
al	consensus.	This	is	the	time	for	every	country	to	prepare	
their	national	action	plan	-	and	act	on	it…If	we	are	unpre-
pared,	the	next	pandemic	will	cause	incalculable	human	
misery.	Both	directly	from	the	loss	of	human	life,	and	indi-
rectly	through	its	widespread	impact	on	security.	No	society	
would	be	exempt.	No	economy	would	be	left	unscathed.
Former WHO Director-General Dr. Lee Jong-wook
November 7, 2005
Nature of an Avian Influenza Crisis
Outbreaks	of	avian	influenza	(H5N1,	avian	flu,	or	bird	flu)	in	Asia,	Europe,	and	
Africa	have	increased	concerns	that	an	influenza	pandemic	is	imminent.	Epi-
demiological	models	estimate	that	if	such	a	pandemic	were	to	occur,	it	would	
paralyze	the	global	economy,	overwhelm	international	vaccine	and	antiviral	
supplies,	cripple	national	healthcare	systems,	and	disrupt	social	order,	with	the	
greatest	impact	occurring	among	less	developed	countries	because	of	their	lim-
ited	surveillance	and	healthcare	resources,	as	well	as	the	overall	poorer	health	
of	their	populations	(WHO	2004a).	Moreover,	an	influenza	pandemic	could	
cause	massive	economic	losses	and	social	unrest	around	the	world	regardless	
of	the	severity	of	the	outbreak	or	number	of	actual	deaths.	For	example,	the	
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economic	impact	of	the	Severe	Acute	Respiratory	
Syndrome	(SARS)	outbreak	in	2002-03,	a	relatively	
mild	and	isolated	outbreak,	was	severely	dispro-
portionate	to	the	number	of	total	infections	and	
deaths.	The	SARS	outbreak	infected	about	8,500	
people	globally,	of	which	only	813	died.2	Econom-
ic	losses	in	East	Asia,	however,	reached	$18	billion,	
or	0.6	percent	of	gross	domestic	product	(Bloom,	
de	Wit,	and	Carangal-San	Jose	2005,	1).	Cana-
da,	which	also	had	SARS-related	deaths,	reported	
combined	economic	losses	and	health	costs	of	over	
$1.1	billion	(Osterholm	2005).	In	addition,	indirect	
costs	associated	with	the	outbreak,	such	as	hospital	
and	school	closings,	restricted	travel,	and	voluntary	
and	enforced	quarantines,	were	disproportionate-
ly	high.	Countries	not	directly	affected	by	SARS	
also	experienced	large	economic	losses,	including	
the	United	States.	Overall,	global	economic	loss-
es	reached	$50	billion	(U.S.	News	&	World	Report	
2005).	In	short,	the	significant	economic	loss	and	
social	unrest	caused	by	SARS	clearly	demonstrat-
ed	that	even	a	disease	with	a	small	health	impact	
can	have	a	massive	economic	effect.	
An	influenza	pandemic	could	create	a	major	cri-
sis	management	situation	unprecedented	in	scale	
and	cost.	The	global	healthcare	system	could	suffer	
from	high	shortages	of	staff,	hospital	beds,	and	sup-
plies.	Hospital	morgues,	medical	examiners,	and	
mortuary	services	would	become	overwhelmed.	
High	absenteeism	from	work	could	disrupt	criti-
cal	infrastructure,	such	as	transportation,	public	
works,	trade	and	commerce,	utilities,	energy,	and	
communication	networks.	Moreover,	a	pandem-
ic	could	threaten	global	security,	the	rule	of	law,	
the	continuity	of	government	services,	and	food	
security,	as	well	as	negatively	affect	internation-
al	trade	and	the	private	sector,	especially	airline	
industries,	small	businesses,	and	food	supplies.	
To	prevent	this,	governments	must	develop	local,	
2	 	Out	of	8,497	reported	SARS	cases	in	30	countries,	only	
813	people	died.	SARS	deaths	occurred	in	Canada	(38),	
China	(730),	France	(1),	Malaysia	(2),	Philippines	(2),	
Singapore	(32),	South	Africa	(1),	Thailand	(2),	and	Viet-
nam	(5)	(WHO	2003).	
national,	regional,	and	international	emergency	
preparedness	plans	to	prevent,	manage,	and	con-
trol	an	outbreak	within	and	beyond	their	borders,	
maintain	essential	social	services	such	as	health	
and	law	enforcement,	and	reduce	the	total	econom-
ic	and	social	impact	of	a	pandemic.	Since	no	single	
government	or	institution	has	the	capacity	to	com-
bat	an	influenza	pandemic	alone,	preparedness	and	
emergency	planning	require	a	serious	intergovern-
mental	and	civil-military	response,	especially	in	the	
Pacific	region	as	the	area	is	the	most	susceptible	
and	likely	source	of	a	future	influenza	pandemic.	
Government	officials,	military	planners,	and	poli-
cy	experts	from	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	the	
ROK	gathered	at	the	September	workshop	agreed	
that	the	health	and	security	risks	surrounding	a	
potential	pandemic	in	the	Asia-Pacific	theater	
required	that	the	three	countries	take	the	lead	in	
planning	for	a	regional	or	multilateral	response	in	
the	region.	One	participant	noted,	“We	need	to	
share	our	national	preparedness	plans	now	in	order	
to	understand	how	we	will	respond	to	a	pandemic.	
We	need	to	know	how	we	will	cooperate	and	inte-
grate	our	three	countries	in	order	to	respond	to	
and	lessen	the	effects	of	a	potentially	devastating	
health,	economic,	and	security	crisis.”
There	are	three	types	of	influenza	virus:	A,	B,	
and	C.	Type	C	viruses	cause	mild	illness	in	humans.	
Types	A	and	B,	however,	cause	epidemics	or	seasonal	
flu	outbreaks	within	a	community	or	region	over	a	
given	period.	Type	A	viruses	are	found	in	a	number	
of	different	animals,	such	as	chickens,	ducks,	pigs,	
and	horses,	as	well	as	among	humans,	whereas	type	
B	viruses	typically	circulate	only	among	humans.	
Three	known	type	A	viruses	(H1N1,	H1N2,	and	
H3N2)	are	currently	circulating	among	humans.	A	
type	A	virus	can	cause	a	pandemic	when	three	con-
ditions	are	met:	1)	a	new	influenza	A	virus	emerg-
es	in	the	human	population,	2)	the	strain	causes	
serious	human	illness	or	fatality,	and	3)	the	strain	
spreads	easily	from	person	to	person	worldwide	
(U.S.	CDC	2006a).
The	avian	flu	is	an	infection	caused	by	influ-
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wild	birds.	Although	wild	birds	carry	type	A	virus-
es,	they	are	silent	carriers	and	thus	do	not	get	sick	
from	the	viruses.	However,	domesticated	birds,	
such	as	chickens,	ducks,	and	turkeys,	do	become	
very	ill	when	infected	by	type	A	viruses.	Since	
infected	wild	birds	shed	the	influenza	virus	in	their	
saliva,	nasal	secretions,	and	feces,	domesticated	
birds	may	become	ill	through	direct	contact	with	
the	infected	wild	birds	or	through	direct	contact	
with	surfaces	that	have	been	contaminated	with	
the	virus.	Typically,	a	highly	pathogenic	form	of	
an	avian	influenza	virus	spreads	quickly	among	
bird	flocks	and	poultry,	killing	90	percent	to	100	
percent	of	those	infected	within	forty-eight	hours	
(U.S.	CDC	2006b).	
A	new	type	A	influenza	strain	circulating	among	
wild	birds,	referred	to	as	H5N1,	was	first	detected	in	
Hong	Kong	in	May	1997	after	authorities	linked	the	
death	of	a	three-year-old	boy	to	a	viral	outbreak	on	
three	rural	chicken	farms	in	Hong	Kong.	By	August	
1997,	an	additional	seventeen	human	cases	of	H5N1	
were	reported,	of	which	five	were	fatal.	In	response,	
authorities	slaughtered	all	1.6	million	chickens	pres-
ent	in	poultry	markets	and	farms	within	Hong	Kong	
to	prevent	any	further	contamination	and	human	
infection	(Snacken	et	al.	1999).	No	more	human	
cases	were	reported	thereafter.	The	virus,	howev-
er,	continued	to	mutate	and	quietly	spread	among	
chicken	flocks	in	China,	eventually	reemerging	
and	rapidly	affecting	poultry	in	eight	other	Asian	
nations	by	late	2003.
In	order	to	prevent	the	spread	of	the	disease	
to	humans	and	other	geographic	areas,	hundreds	of	
millions	of	poultry	have	been	destroyed	in	South	
East	Asia	since	2003.	Despite	multiple	attempts	to	
contain	the	virus,	however,	WHO	confirmed	49	
human	cases	of	avian	influenza	in	Thailand	and	
Vietnam	in	2003-04,	of	which	35	were	fatal.	By	the	
end	of	2005,	an	additional	95	human	cases	were	
reported	in	Cambodia	(4),	China	(8),	Indonesia	
3	 	Affected	countries	included	Cambodia,	China,	Indo-
nesia,	Japan,	Lao	People’s	Democratic	Republic,	the	
Republic	of	Korea,	Thailand,	and	Vietnam	(WHO	
2005a).	
(17),	Thailand	(5),	and	Vietnam	(61),	of	which	41	
were	fatal.	What	is	most	alarming,	however,	is	the	
expanded	geographic	reach	of	the	disease	among	
animals	and	humans	to	parts	of	South	Asia,	Europe	
and	Eurasia,	the	Near	East,	and	Africa.	To	date,	
about	sixty	countries	have	reported	cases	of	avian	
influenza	in	animals.	As	of	December	2006,	the	
WHO	had	confirmed	116	new	human	cases	of	avian	
influenza	in	2006	in	Azerbaijan	(8),	Cambodia	(2),	
China	(13),	Djibouti	(1),	Egypt	(18),	Indonesia	(56),	
Iraq	(3),	Thailand	(3),	and	Turkey	(12),	of	which	
80	have	been	fatal.	Since	2003,	263	human	cases	
have	been	reported,	of	which	158	have	been	fatal	
–	a	60	percent	mortality	rate	(WHO	2006a).	The	
actual	number	of	infected	people	with	the	H5N1	
virus,	however,	may	well	exceed	current	figures	
since	milder	cases	may	not	have	been	reported	to	
health	officials.	As	a	result,	the	mortality	rate	may	
be	slightly	exaggerated	though	it	has	jumped	nev-
ertheless	from	33	percent	in	1997	to	69	percent	in	
2006.
Despite	the	growing	number	of	human	cases,	
several	countries,	Vietnam	and	Thailand	in	partic-
ular,	have	made	great	strides	to	halt	the	spread	of	
the	avian	flu	within	their	borders.	Vietnam,	which	
accounted	for	65	percent	of	all	confirmed	human	
cases	through	the	end	of	2005,	vaccinated	220	mil-
lion	chickens	in	2005	and	culled	tens	of	thousands	
of	suspect	fowl.	Moreover,	the	Ministry	of	Agricul-
ture	and	Rural	Development	banned	poultry	farm-
ing	in	towns	and	cities	such	as	Hanoi	and	Ho	Chi	
Minh	City,	in	addition	to	raising	public	awareness,	
stockpiling	antiviral	drugs,	and	establishing	infor-
mation	and	surveillance	networks.	Farmers,	howev-
er,	were	not	compensated	adequately,	forcing	some	
to	smuggle	birds	to	urban	centers	for	illegal	sales.	
Nevertheless,	Vietnam	did	not	have	any	human	
cases	of	the	H5N1	virus	in	2006.
Thailand,	on	the	other	hand,	did	not	carry	out	
large	vaccinations,	fearing	other	countries	would	
ban	the	import	of	its	poultry.	Instead,	the	govern-
ment	culled	wide	areas	around	infected	flocks,	
compensated	farmers	generously,	and	appointed	
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try	(McNeil	2006).	The	government	did	vaccinate	
all	fighting	cocks	and	issued	them	travel	papers	
with	vaccination	records.	For	the	first	six	months	
of	2006,	Thailand	had	not	reported	any	human	
cases	of	H5N1.	Unfortunately,	the	virus	resurfaced	
in	Thailand	in	late	2006,	infecting	three	more	peo-
ple.
Since	1997,	H5N1	has	mutated	from	a	low	patho-
genic	avian	influenza	(LPAI)	strain	to	a	highly	
pathogenic	avian	influenza	(HPAI)	strain	with	
limited	transmission	to	humans	from	infected	poul-
try.	To	date,	the	H5N1	strain	has	not	mutated	into	
a	form	that	could	easily	spread	between	humans.	
Although	a	few	cases	involving	limited	human-to-
human	transmission	were	confirmed	in	Vietnam	
and	Thailand	in	2004,	the	virus	never	spread	
beyond	the	initial	family	unit.	A	family	cluster	in	
Indonesia	in	May	2006,	however,	raised	health	con-
cerns	of	a	possible	human-to-human	strain	after	a	
thirty-seven-year-old	woman	contracted	the	illness	
and	infected	seven	other	family	members,	including	
one	family	member	who	was	not	in	direct	contact	
with	her.	In	response	to	this	outbreak,	Indonesian	
and	WHO	health	officials	placed	the	immediate	
area	under	quarantine	and	distributed	antiviral	
medications	to	surviving	family	members	and	close	
contacts.	In	the	end,	WHO	officials	confirmed	that	
the	H5N1	virus	had	mutated,	but	there	was	no	evi-
dence	of	increased	or	sustained	human-to-human	
transmission	 beyond	 the	 initial	 family	 cluster.	
Despite	this	finding,	officials	have	confirmed	an	
additional	thirty	human	cases	of	H5N1	in	Indone-
sia	though	none	were	related	to	the	family	cluster.	
Overall,	Indonesia	has	accounted	for	most	of	the	
human	cases	of	avian	influenza	in	2006.	The	coun-
try	has	been	under	fire	for	moving	slowly	to	stamp	
out	the	disease	when	it	first	appeared	in	2003,	but	
it	has	since	increased	the	vaccination	or	culling	of	
birds	in	infected	areas.	Nevertheless,	the	disease	is	
endemic	in	the	bird	population	of	Indonesia.
Although	the	avian	flu	has	not	been	classified	
as	a	pandemic,	it	has	nevertheless	met	two	of	the	
three	conditions	necessary	for	a	pandemic	to	occur.	
“First,	a	new	strain	of	the	virus,	called	A	(H5N1),	has	
emerged,	and	humans	have	little	or	no	immunity	
to	it.	Second,	this	strain	can	jump	between	spe-
cies.	The	only	remaining	obstacle	is	that	A	(H5N1)	
has	not	yet	mutated	into	a	form	that	is	easily	trans-
mitted	from	human	to	human”	(Obama	and	Lugar	
2005).	However,	reports	have	confirmed	cases	
involving	some	mammals	not	previously	consid-
ered	susceptible	to	the	disease,	such	as	domestic	
cats,	indicating	the	virus	has	mutated	and	could	
eventually	emerge	into	a	new	viral	form	with	sus-
tained	human-to-human	transmission.	
To	date,	almost	all	human	cases	have	involved	
individuals	with	direct	contact	with	diseased	poul-
try	and	ducks	in	household	flocks	as	opposed	to	
commercial	flocks.	Vulnerable	populations	include	
market	workers,	poultry	farmers,	workers	in	other	
related	fields	with	frequent	contact	with	infected	
birds,	and	healthcare	professionals.	As	a	result,	
adult	workers	are	at	most	risk	even	though	typi-
cal	influenza	viruses	usually	affect	the	very	young,	
elderly,	and	immuno-compromised	individuals.	
Symptoms	of	human	infections	of	avian	influenza	
are	similar	to	seasonal	flu	symptoms	(high	fever,	
sore	throat,	cough,	malaise);	however,	bacterial	
or	viral	pneumonia,	acute	respiratory	failure,	and	
other	serious	lethal	complications	also	develop.	In	
most	cases,	the	disease	has	affected	multiple	organs	
and	systems,	with	rapid	clinical	deterioration	and	
high	mortality.	Almost	all	infected	patients	to	date	
have	developed	pneumonia.
A Pandemic Impact
A	global	outbreak	of	a	new	human	influenza	is	a	
rare	but	recurrent	event.	According	to	historical	
data,	pandemics	occur	roughly	every	thirty	to	fifty	
years.	Although	estimates	vary	widely,	the	WHO	
and	World	Bank	have	predicted	anywhere	from	5	
million	to	150	million	deaths	globally	in	the	event	of	
a	pandemic	influenza,	with	the	majority	of	deaths	
likely	to	occur	in	developing	countries.	“Even	in	one	
of	the	more	conservative	scenarios,	it	has	been	cal-
culated	that	the	world	will	face	up	to	233	million	
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and	7.4	million	deaths	globally”	(WHO	2005b).	
If	the	last	three	major	flu	pandemics,	which	also	
mutated	from	forms	of	avian	influenza,	can	serve	
as	a	guide,	a	new	avian	influenza	pandemic	could	
cause	catastrophic	economic	and	social	crises	at	
national,	regional,	and	global	levels.	The	Spanish	
flu	(1918-19)	killed	an	estimated	500,000	people	in	
the	United	States	and	20	million	to	50	million	peo-
ple	worldwide.	Almost	half	of	those	who	died	were	
between	the	ages	of	twenty	and	thirty-five.	More-
over,	roughly	200	million	to	1	billion	were	infected	
worldwide.	The	Asian	flu	(1957-58),	which	originat-
ed	in	China,	killed	approximately	70,000	people	
in	the	United	States	and	2	million	people	world-
wide.	The	Hong	Kong	flu	(1968-69)	caused	roughly	
34,000	deaths	in	the	United	States	and	3	million	
worldwide.	Although	the	development	of	vaccines	
helped	slow	the	spread	of	the	viruses	and	decrease	
the	total	number	of	deaths,	the	Asian	and	Hong	
Kong	flus	combined	cost	over	$34	billion	in	health	
care	and	lost	productivity	(CNN.com	2003).	
Although	health	experts	are	uncertain	about	the	
timing,	virulence,	and	geographic	scope	of	a	future	
influenza	pandemic,	most	predict	that	it	will	have	
the	same	health	and	economic	impact	as	the	Hong	
Kong	flu	of	1968.	One	workshop	participant	project-
ed,	“Based	on	a	35	percent	attack	rate,	an	avian	flu	
pandemic	could	result	in	up	to	500	million	cases	
with	875,000	to	1.6	million	requiring	medical	care,	
6.4	million	to	28.1	million	hospitalizations,	and	2	
million	to	7.4	million	deaths.	Moreover,	the	pan-
demic	would	occur	during	a	few	weeks	and	over	
several	waves.”	In	fact,	an	influenza	pandemic	usu-
ally	strikes	in	two	or	more	waves,	either	during	the	
same	year	or	in	successive	influenza	seasons.	Each	
pandemic	wave	usually	lasts	eight	weeks,	and	each	
subsequent	wave	brings	about	greater	morbidity	
and	mortality	than	the	preceding	wave.	A	February	
2006	report	by	the	Lowy	Institute	for	International	
Policy	in	Australia	studied	the	impact	of	an	influ-
enza	pandemic	on	the	global	economy	under	four	
different	scenarios:	mild,	moderate,	severe,	and	
ultra.	According	to	the	report,	a	mild	pandemic	
could	kill	an	estimated	1.4	million	people	and	cost	
roughly	0.8	percent	(or	$330	billion)	in	lost	eco-
nomic	output	worldwide.	Under	an	ultra	scenario,	
the	loss	to	global	GDP	could	reach	12.6	percent	
(or	$4.4	trillion)	with	over	142.2	million	deaths	
(McKibbon	and	Sidorenko	2006,	1).	The	above	table	
illustrates	the	impact	of	a	pandemic	on	the	United	
States,	Japan,	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	(McKib-
bon	and	Sidorenko	2006,	tables	1-7).
Workshop	participants	estimated	that	in	addi-
tion	to	a	devastating	human	health	impact,	an	
influenza	pandemic	could	cost	the	world	economy	
up	to	$2	trillion	in	economic	losses.	The	projected	
healthcare	costs	for	the	United	States	are	about	$70	
to	$166	billion.	In	Asia	alone,	a	sustained	human-
to-human	spread	of	the	H5N1	virus	could	cost	
anywhere	from	$110	billion	to	$300	billion	in	eco-
nomic	losses	(Asian	Development	Bank	2006).	To	
date,	the	current	H5N1	outbreak	has	had	direct	
economic	costs	in	Southeast	Asia	of	$8	billion	to	
$12	billion	(WHO	2006b).	In	addition	to	the	direct	
costs	of	treating	patients	and	culling	infected	ani-
mal	flocks,	numerous	indirect	costs	are	associated	
with	the	prevention	and	management	of	a	pandem-
ic.	Such	costs	include	the	development	of	a	system	
of	surveillance	and	containment,	as	well	as	the	
research,	development,	production,	and	distribution	
of	vaccines	and	antiviral	medications.	Moreover,	a	
pandemic	would	likely	disrupt	basic	social	servic-
4	 	A	mild	scenario	is	similar	to	the	1968-69	Hong	Kong	
flu;	a	moderate	scenario	is	similar	to	the	1957-58	Asian	
flu;	a	severe	scenario	is	similar	to	the	1918-19	Spanish	
flu;	and	an	ultra	scenario	is	worse	than	the	Spanish	
flu.
Mild Scenario Moderate Scenario Severe Scenario Ultra Scenario
Deaths GDP Loss Deaths GDP Loss Deaths GDP Loss Deaths GDP Loss
USA 20.2 -0.58 201.9 -1.38 1,009 -3.00 2,019 -5.50
Japan 21.5 -1.0 214.6 -3.34 1,073 -8.26 2,146 -15.77
ROK 11.8 -0.85 117.5 -3.15 588 -7.82 1,175 -15.06
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es	and	cause	panic	and	unrest.	During	the	SARS	
outbreak,	for	example,	people	tried	to	minimize	
interaction	“resulting	in	a	severe	demand	shock	for	
services	sectors	such	as	tourism,	mass	transporta-
tion,	retail	sales,	hotels,	and	restaurants,	as	well	
as	a	supply	shock	due	to	workplace	absenteeism,	
disruption	of	production	processes	and	shifts	to	
more	costly	procedures”	(Brahmbhatt	2005).	In	the	
event	of	a	pandemic,	the	rate	of	workplace	absentee-
ism	is	expected	to	reach	40	percent,	and	will	likely	
increase	when	certain	public	health	measures,	such	
as	school	closings	or	quarantines,	are	implemented	
(Homeland	Security	Council	2006,	25).	
Medical Prevention 
and Treatment
Although	research	studies	are	underway,	there	is	no	
vaccine	currently	available	to	protect	individuals	
against	the	H5N1	virus.	Even	if	one	were	to	become	
available,	influenza	viruses	constantly	mutate	and	
evolve	each	year,	leaving	treatments	virtually	inef-
fective	for	any	future	mutations.	Furthermore,	
current	influenza	vaccine	production	is	based	on	
an	outmoded	and	lengthy	process	that	uses	chicken	
eggs.	It	takes	up	to	six	months	after	the	onset	of	a	
pandemic	to	develop	an	effective	vaccine	using	this	
egg-based	technology.	Given	the	lag	time	between	
the	identification	of	a	viral	strain,	the	production	
of	a	vaccine,	and	the	final	delivery	of	a	product,	as	
well	as	the	finite	manufacturing	capacity,	no	com-
pany	will	be	able	to	meet	production	targets	and	
satisfy	national	demand,	let	alone	global	demand,	if	
a	pandemic	strain	were	to	hit.	Several	countries	are	
exploring	cell-based	vaccine	technologies	to	expand	
manufacturing	speed	and	production.	Moreover,	
in	anticipation	of	a	pandemic	strain,	pharmaceuti-
cal	companies	are	developing	“pre-vaccines”	based	
on	the	current	animal	influenza	strains	that	have	
caused	human	infections.	However,	since	influen-
za	viruses	constantly	mutate,	a	pre-vaccine	may	not	
necessarily	provide	any	protection	against	a	poten-
tial	pandemic	influenza	strain.	“Severe	shortages	of	
vaccines	are	expected,	especially	during	the	early	
stages	of	a	pandemic,	and	since	influenza	virus-
es	constantly	mutate,	no	vaccine	will	be	able	to	
completely	wipe	out	the	virus,”	commented	one	
workshop	participant.	
The	current	manufacturing	capacity	for	influ-
enza	vaccines	is	concentrated	in	Australia,	Europe,	
Japan,	and	North	America,	raising	concerns	over	
the	affordability,	supply,	and	potentially	inequitable	
distribution	of	an	H5N1	vaccine	to	less	developed	
countries.	The	WHO	has	hosted	several	informal	
meetings	with	influenza	vaccine	manufacturers	
and	government	representatives	to	discuss	the	
obstacles	to	pandemic	vaccine	development.	Par-
ticipants	have	recommended	several	solutions,	such	
as	facilitating	the	exchange	of	non-proprietary	
information,	coordinating	national	regulatory	pro-
cesses,	and	developing	antigen-sparing	strategies	
to	complement	limited	vaccine	supplies.	Fifteen	
pharmaceutical	companies	in	Australia,	Austria,	
Canada,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Japan,	the	Neth-
erlands,	Switzerland,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	
United	States	have	approximately	thirty-one	pan-
demic	avian	influenza	vaccines	in	human	or	clinical	
trials	(Fox	2006).
Pending	the	availability	of	a	vaccine	to	combat	
the	H5N1	virus,	antiviral	medications	may	provide	
a	good	defense	against	infection,	or	at	minimum,	
mitigate	the	severity	of	influenza	symptoms	if	taken	
within	forty-eight	hours	of	the	onset	of	flu	symp-
toms.	Four	antiviral	drugs	are	approved	to	treat	
influenza:	amantadine,	rimantadine,	oseltamivir	
(Tamiflu®),	and	zanamivir	(Relenza®).	However,	
recent	studies	have	shown	that	the	H5N1	virus	may	
be	resistant	to	both	amantadine	and	rimantadine.	
Although	it	is	difficult	to	predict	the	effectiveness	
of	antiviral	medications	against	a	human-to-human	
strain	of	the	H5N1	virus,	countries	around	the	world	
are	nevertheless	stockpiling	Tamiflu®	and	Relen-
za®.5	Hoffman-La	Roche	and	GlaxoSmithKline,	the	
pharmaceutical	manufacturers	of	Tamiflu®	and	
5	 	The	FDA	has	approved	Tamiflu®	(capsule)	for	both	the	
treatment	and	prevention	of	influenza	in	adults	and	chil-
dren,	whereas	Relenza®	(oral	inhaler)	was	approved	to	
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Relenza®	respectively,	have	received	orders	from	
governments	around	the	world	to	stockpile	enough	
drugs	to	cover	20	percent	to	40	percent	of	nation-
al	populations	(Roche	2005a).	The	WHO	does	
recommend	that	governments	worldwide	stock	
enough	antiviral	agents	to	treat	at	least	25	percent	
of	their	populations.	Current	global	supplies	can	
only	treat	2	percent	of	the	world	population	(Cho-
sun	Ilbo	2005).
To	ensure	the	availability	of	antiviral	agents	to	
countries	in	need,	the	WHO	signed	an	agreement	
with	Roche	to	create	an	international	stockpile	of	
Tamiflu®	(Roche	2005b).	In	April	2006,	Roche	
announced	that	the	rapid	response	stockpile,	which	
consists	of	three	million	treatment	courses	of	Tam-
iflu®	(or	thirty	million	capsules)	reserved	for	WHO	
use,	is	available	for	delivery.	Facilities	in	the	United	
States	and	Switzerland	will	house	the	international	
stockpiles,	which	are	reserved	for	the	exclusive	use	
of	the	WHO	at	the	site	of	the	pandemic	outbreak	in	
order	to	contain	the	virus	or	slow	its	spread	to	other	
areas.	Under	a	separate	agreement,	Roche	donat-
ed	an	additional	two	million	courses	to	the	WHO	
for	the	creation	of	regional	stockpiles.
Roche	has	established	relationships	with	over	
fifty	partners	and	has	doubled	manufacturing	
capacity	in	recent	years.	The	company	hopes	to	pro-
duce	over	three	hundred	million	treatment	courses	
of	Tamiflu®	annually	by	2007,	a	ten-fold	increase	
in	production	since	2003.	Moreover,	Roche	signed	
several	licensing	and	sublicensing	agreements	in	
late	2005	with	countries	or	companies	interested	in	
producing	the	drug	locally,	including	China,	Japan,	
South	Korea,	and	India.
Although	many	governments	around	the	world	
are	building	national	stockpiles	of	antiviral	medica-
tions	and	other	personal	protective	equipment,	few	
developing	countries	have	taken	any	steps	to	pre-
pare	for	an	avian	flu	outbreak,	raising	concerns	that	
an	isolated	outbreak	in	one	country	could	quickly	
turn	into	a	global	epidemic	if	the	infected	country	
is	unprepared	to	contain	the	event.	Unfortunately,	
pandemic	influenza	planning	requires	a	signifi-
cant	financial	investment,	which	most	countries	
are	unwilling	to	make,	especially	since	a	pan-
demic	influenza	crisis,	although	possible,	is	not	
necessarily	a	guaranteed	event.	Moreover,	antivi-
ral	medications	are	expensive.	For	example,	the	
cost	to	stockpile	enough	courses	of	Tamiflu®	(at	
$15	per	treatment	course)	to	treat	30	percent	of	the	
five	billion	people	living	in	the	developing	world	is	
approximately	$22.5	billion.	Given	this	high	cost,	it	
is	unlikely	that	developing	countries	will	stockpile	
enough	antiviral	agents	to	treat	25	percent	to	30	
percent	of	their	populations	or	that	the	more	devel-
oped	countries	will	do	so	on	their	behalf.	Moreover,	
even	if	some	developed	countries	do	donate	(as	
some	already	have)	funds,	antiviral	agents,	or	pro-
tective	personal	equipment,	such	as	masks,	gloves,	
and	sprayers	to	assist	in	decontaminating	hospital	
rooms,	developing	countries	suffer	from	far	more	
lethal	infectious	diseases	that	compete	for	the	same	
resources.	One	workshop	participant	argued,	“It	
is	unreasonable	to	expect	developing	countries	to	
invest	money	into	pandemic	influenza	planning.	
The	developing	world	lacks	basic	health	services	
and	faces	far	greater	health	concerns	than	avian	
influenza,	such	as	HIV/AIDS,	malaria,	and	tuber-
culosis.”
Another	workshop	participant	suggested	that	
perhaps	one	way	both	to	prepare	less	developed	
countries	for	an	avian	flu	outbreak	and	to	address	
other	infectious	disease	concerns	is	to	make	a	basic	
investment	in	the	overall	healthcare	systems	of	the	
developing	world.	To	this	end,	the	WHO,	Food	and	
Agriculture	Organization	(FAO),	and	the	World	
Organization	for	Animal	Health	(OIE)	have	intro-
duced	some	long-term	prevention	strategies	to	
minimize	the	risk	of	human	avian	influenza	and	
reduce	the	threat	of	future	infectious	disease	out-
breaks,	such	as	increasing	human	and	food	safety,	
improving	rural	development,	strengthening	vet-
erinary	controls,	and	restructuring	the	farming	
industries	to	improve	bio-security.	Other	workshop	
participants	agreed	that	such	long-term	measures	
would	strengthen	the	developing	world’s	ability	to	
prevent	and	contain	future	outbreaks	of	infectious	
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However,	there	still	exists	an	immediate	need	
to	develop	appropriate	response	measures	against	
a	potential	influenza	pandemic,	especially	since	
any	capacity-building	measures	would	require	sev-
eral	years	to	take	effect.	Since	many	third	world	
countries	lack	the	capacity	to	address	pandem-
ic	influenza	planning	today,	governments	from	
developed	countries	need	to	provide	the	neces-
sary	resources	to	prevent	and	manage	an	avian	flu	
outbreak,	such	as	reinforcing	international	and	
regional	stockpiles,	strengthening	local	laboratory	
and	health	systems,	and	introducing	health	train-
ing	and	education	measures.	“We	need	to	address	
the	immediate	gap	between	the	rich	and	poor,	not	
only	for	ethical	and	humanitarian	reasons,	but	
also	from	a	national	security	perspective.	If	vac-
cines,	antiviral	medications,	or	other	prophylaxes	
are	limited	to	the	rich,	countries	in	the	develop-
ing	world	will	not	be	able	to	respond	effectively	to	
an	avian	influenza	outbreak	within	their	borders.	
If	left	untreated,	the	avian	flu	will	quickly	spread	
to	other	countries	and	turn	what	could	have	been	
a	localized	outbreak	into	a	devastating	pandemic,”	
cautioned	one	participant.	“However,	short-	and	
mid-term	solutions	will	not	profoundly	strengthen	
the	ability	of	less	developed	countries	to	respond	
to	a	pandemic	or	improve	the	inequitable	access	to	
pandemic	vaccines	and	antiviral	medications,	leav-
ing	the	majority	unarmed	against	the	avian	flu,”	
countered	another	workshop	participant.
Emergency Preparedness 
and Planning 
Although	it	is	uncertain	if,	and	when,	an	influen-
za	pandemic	will	occur,	H5N1	is	nonetheless	an	
animal	virus	with	extremely	high	pandemic	poten-
tial	and	devastating	health,	economic,	and	security	
consequences.	An	influenza	pandemic,	especially	
if	followed	by	a	shortage	of	vaccines	and	antiviral	
medications	–	a	highly	probable	scenario	–	will	
force	governments	to	restrict	travel,	establish	quar-
antines,	and	close	borders,	which	one	workshop	
participant	warned	“gives	a	false	sense	of	security	
and	are	ineffective	means	to	stopping	the	spread	
of	an	infectious	disease.”	In	order	to	effectively	
combat	an	influenza	virus	with	pandemic	poten-
tial,	ensure	the	equitable	distribution	of	vaccines	
and	antiviral	medications,	and	reduce	the	economic	
and	social	impact	of	an	outbreak,	governments	and	
their	partners	should	prepare	influenza	pandemic	
plans	at	the	national,	regional,	and	international	
level,	as	well	as	test	their	planning	efforts	with	sim-
ulations	and	tabletop	exercises.
In	addition,	government	officials	should	improve	
risk	communication,	develop	public	awareness	
campaigns,	 and	 integrate	 non-health	 entities,	
including	 the	 private	 sector,	 law	 enforcement,	
and	critical	infrastructure	such	as	transportation,	
utilities,	energy,	and	communications	networks,	
into	planning	efforts.	“It	is	the	responsibility	of	
the	government	to	operate	independently	and	in	
harmony	with	other	partners,	to	collaborate,	to	
integrate	response	plans,	and	to	develop	alliances	
with	healthcare	organizations,	unions,	the	media,	
and	private	sector	companies,”	advised	one	partic-
ipant.	In	order	to	mitigate	the	potential	economic,	
governance,	and	humanitarian	consequences	of	a	
pandemic,	governments	must	adopt	a	multi-sectoral	
approach	to	pandemic	planning	and	focus	response	
plans	on	the	following	objectives:
•  Animal health surveillance and bio-security
•  Public awareness and communication cam-
paigns
•  Incentives and compensation schemes for 
those affected by control measures
•  Human health surveillance
•  Continuity of governance and services under 
pandemic conditions
•  Coordination of local, national, regional, and 
international stakeholders for avian human 
influenza action and response
•  Engagement of private and volunteer sectors	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge		|		Pandemic	Influenza	&	Response	Planning	
United Nations System 
Influenza Coordination
The	Office	of	the	United	Nations	System	Influen-
za	Coordination	(UNSIC)	was	created	within	the	
United	Nations	Development	Group	(UNDG)	to	sup-
port	the	different	initiatives	of	the	UN	system	and	
coordinate	the	UN	response	to	the	avian	flu	and	
the	threat	of	a	human	pandemic.	The	main	tasks	of	
the	United	Nations	system	influenza	coordinator,	
Dr.	David	Nabarro,	include	the	implementation	of	
a	comprehensive	unified	strategy	for	the	UN	sys-
tem	on	prevention,	preparedness,	and	response	to	
pandemic	influenza,	as	well	as	to	help	develop	and	
test	country	and	regional	preparedness	strategies	
and	contingency	plans.	Additional	responsibilities	
of	UNSIC	include:
•  Maintaining communication between the var-
ious UN agencies, governments, and donor 
agencies
•  Briefing the international community on key 
issues and developments
•  Raising public awareness and updating the 
media with situation reports
•  Improving the availability of antiviral med-
ications,  vaccines,  and  other  essential 
protective  equipment  for  humans  and 
poultry
•  Tracking the availability of funds needed for 
prevention and preparedness
•  Advocating resource mobilization
UN	agencies	working	with	UNSIC	include	the	
WHO,	FAO,	and	OIE.	
In	March	2006,	the	UN	secretary	general	asked	
all	UN	offices,	including	headquarters,	UN	coun-
try	teams	(UNCT),	and	UN	missions,	to	complete	
their	pandemic	contingency	plans	by	the	end	of	
May	2006.	About	125	of	the	148	UNCTs	had	submit-
ted	their	pandemic	contingency	plans	by	the	end	of	
June.	After	reviewing	each	of	the	submitted	plans,	
UNSIC	will	prepare	and	distribute	a	summary	of	
the	best	practices	and	strategies	identified	from	
the	UNCT	plans.	UNSIC	also	plans	to	upgrade	the	
UN	influenza	web	portal	to	announce	upcoming	
conferences	and	improve	access	to	communication	
tools	and	coordination	procedures.	A	link	to	infor-
mation	about	UNSIC	is	available	on	the	UNDG	
website,	http://www.undg.org.
World Health Organization
The	WHO,	headquartered	in	Geneva,	is	the	Unit-
ed	Nations	specialized	agency	on	human	health.	As	
such,	the	WHO	is	the	central	actor	for	coordinating	
the	global	response	to	an	avian	influenza	outbreak,	
advising	countries	to	develop	national	preparedness	
plans,	create	or	strengthen	surveillance	systems,	
and	coordinate	national	and	international	efforts.	In	
1952,	the	WHO	established	the	WHO	Global	Influ-
enza	Surveillance	Network	to	serve	as	a	global	alert	
mechanism	designed	to	identify	influenza	virus-
es	with	pandemic	potential.	This	network,	which	
includes	four	WHO	Collaborating	Centres	located	in	
Australia,	Japan,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	Unit-
ed	States,	and	112	National	Influenza	Centres	(NICs)	
around	the	world,	has	taken	the	lead	in	monitor-
ing	the	current	pandemic	influenza	threat.	As	part	
of	this	network,	the	WHO	also	created	the	Glob-
al	Outbreak	Alert	&	Response	Network	(GOARN)	
in	2000	to	serve	as	a	technical	collaboration	clear-
inghouse	of	human	and	technical	resources	for	the	
rapid	identification	of	and	response	to	infectious	
disease	outbreaks.	The	GOARN	international	team,	
which	includes	epidemiologists,	infection	control	
experts,	and	laboratory	technicians	from	over	100	
partner	institutes,	such	as	the	U.S.	Centers	for	Dis-
ease	Control	and	Prevention	(CDC),	the	European	
Programme	for	Intervention	Epidemiology	Train-
ing	Network,	the	Institut	Pasteur	Network	(France),	
the	Institute	for	Infectious	Disease	Control	(Swe-
den),	the	National	Institute	of	Infectious	Diseases	
(Japan),	and	other	national	and	international	agen-
cies,	has	traveled	to	countries	to	report	on	avian	
influenza	outbreaks,	conduct	field	research,	and	
collect	data.	The	team’s	goal	is	to	contain	all	out-
breaks	of	avian	flu	through	the	rapid	identification,	
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as	the	prompt	delivery	of	necessary	technical	assis-
tance	to	the	outbreak	site.	
In	2002,	the	Global	Agenda	on	Influenza	Sur-
veillance	and	Control	was	developed	to	raise	pub-
lic	awareness	over	the	health	threat	of	influenza.	
Measures	adopted	to	increase	influenza	surveil-
lance	and	control	have	included	improved	guid-
ance	on	the	use	of	vaccines	and	other	preventative	
tools,	the	development	of	national,	regional,	and	
global	pandemic	preparedness	plans,	and	the	dis-
tribution	of	studies	to	enhance	global	understand-
ing	of	the	health	and	economic	burden	of	influenza.	
The	WHO	hosted	a	training	workshop	on	influen-
za	surveillance	and	control	in	Tokyo	in	May	2004	
and	in	Kuala	Lumpur,	Malaysia	in	April	2005.	The	
primary	objective	of	both	workshops	was	to	update	
participants	on	WHO	influenza	surveillance	guide-
lines,	share	national	preparedness	plans,	report	
on	the	status	of	vaccine	and	antiviral	drug	devel-
opment,	and	discuss	the	establishment	of	NICs	
in	countries	without	influenza	surveillance	cen-
ters.	In	addition,	the	WHO	has	published	multi-
ple	reports	that	outline	the	responsibilities	of	the	
WHO	and	national	authorities	during	a	pandem-
ic,	such	as	the	WHO	Guidelines	on	the	Use	of	Vac-
cines	and	Antivirals	during	Influenza	Pandemics	
(2004),	WHO	Global	Influenza	Preparedness	Plan	
(2005),	and	WHO	Checklist	for	Influenza	Pandem-
ic	Preparedness	Planning	(2005).	A	complete	listing	
of	pandemic	influenza	reports,	general	informa-
tion,	surveillance	and	infection	control	guidelines,	
and	country	updates	is	available	on	the	WHO	web-
site:	www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/.	
The	WHO	website	also	displays	submitted	national	
influenza	pandemic	plans,	including	the	response	
plans	of	Australia,	France,	Hong	Kong,	Japan,	Sin-
gapore,	and	Thailand	to	name	a	few.	To	date,	nei-
ther	the	Republic	of	Korea	nor	the	United	States	
have	submitted	their	national	preparedness	plans	
to	the	WHO	website	(though	the	United	States	has	
submitted	the	pandemic	plan	issued	by	the	Depart-
ment	of	Health	and	Human	Services).
The	WHO	Global	Influenza	Preparedness	Plan	
(2005)	identified	six	phases	of	increasing	pub-
lic	health	risk	associated	with	the	emergence	of	
an	influenza	subtype	that	could	pose	a	pandem-
ic	threat.	The	six	phases	were	grouped	into	three	
periods:	the	interpandemic	period	(Phases	1-2),	the	
pandemic	alert	period	(Phases	3-5),	and	the	pan-
demic	period	(Phase	6).	The	distinction	between	
each	phase	within	a	given	period	depends	on	the	
risk	of	human	infection	or	pandemic.	The	WHO	
preparedness	plan	also	outlined	specific	objectives	
and	actions	for	national	authorities	and	the	WHO	
Interpandemic Period Overarching Public Health Goals
Phase 1. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influ-
enza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If 
present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low.
Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at 
the global, national, and subnational levels.
Phase 2. No new influenza virus subtypes have been detect-
ed in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus 
subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.
Minimize the risk of transmission to humans; detect 
and report such transmission rapidly if it occurs.
Pandemic Alert Period
Phase 3. Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-
human spread, or at most, rare instances of spread to a close contact. 
Ensure rapid characterization of the new 
virus subtype and early detection, notifica-
tion, and response to additional cases.
Phase 4. Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission, but spread 
is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.
Contain the new virus within limited foci or delay 
the spread to gain time to implement prepared-
ness measures, including vaccine development.
Phase 5. Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, sug-
gesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, 
but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).
Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread, to 
possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain time to 
implement pandemic response measures.
Pandemic Period
Phase 6. Pandemic: increased and sustained transmission in general population. Minimize the impact of the pandemic.	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge		|		Pandemic	Influenza	&	Response	Planning	
to	take	during	each	phase.	The	six	phases	were	
broken	down	further	into	five	categories:	planning	
and	coordination,	situation	monitoring	and	assess-
ment,	prevention	and	containment,	health	system	
response,	and	communications.	The	WHO	has	clas-
sified	the	current	global	situation	as	phase	3.	
On	May	23,	2005,	the	World	Health	Assembly	
revised	the	International	Health	Regulations	(IHR	
2005)	to	require	member	states	to	develop	and	
maintain	core	surveillance	and	response	capaci-
ties,	report	public	health	events	to	the	WHO,	and	
respond	to	public	health	emergencies.	The	IHR	
(2005)	also	requires	the	WHO	to	evaluate	mem-
ber	states’	emergency	response	plans,	facilitate	
technical	cooperation,	provide	logistical	support,	
and	mobilize	financial	resources	in	order	to	build	
local	capacity	in	surveillance	and	response.	The	
IHR	(2005)	will	enter	into	force	on	June	15,	2007.	
Until	that	time,	the	WHO	Influenza	Pandemic	Task	
Force	(IPTF)	will	advise	the	WHO	on	potential	
public	health	issues	of	international	concern	relat-
ed	to	avian	and	pandemic	influenza.	The	IPTF	
met	for	the	first	time	in	Geneva	on	September	26,	
2006,	to	iron	out	administrative	issues	and	oper-
ational	procedures,	clarify	the	criteria	for	mov-
ing	between	pandemic	alert	phases,	define	critical	
clinical	and	epidemiological	data	on	human	cases	
of	avian	influenza,	develop	a	list	of	important	data	
elements	(e.g.,	the	geographic	extent	of	the	event	
and	control	measures	implemented	on	the	ground),	
and	endorse	the	WHO	proposals	for	best	practices	
in	sharing	influenza	viruses	and	genetic	sequenc-
es	(WHO	2006c).	
World Health Organization 
– Western Pacific Region7
The	WHO	regional	office	for	the	Western	Pacific	
Region	(WPRO)	developed	a	framework	to	assist	
6	 	For	a	complete	list	of	the	members	present	at	the	first	
IPTF	meeting,	see	the	World	Health	Organization	
website,	 http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/pandemictask-
forceparticipants/en/index.html.
7	 	WHO	Western	Pacific	Region	represents	Australia,	
Brunei	Darussalam,	Cambodia,	China,	Cook	Islands,	
countries	in	the	region	with	the	development	of	
national	emergency	response	programs	to	combat	
communicable	diseases	and	manage	natural	or	
human-generated	disasters.	“Creating	and	Track-
ing	Pandemic	Preparedness	Plans:	A	Guide”	(WHO	
2006d)	outlines	the	process	for	constructing	pan-
demic	preparedness	plans	and	identifies	key	issues	
and	tasks	that	should	be	adopted	during	each	phase	
of	a	pandemic.	In	addition	to	the	planning	guide,	
the	WPRO	published	the	“Exercise	Development	
Guide	for	Validating	Influenza	Pandemic	Plans”	
(WHO	2006e)	to	encourage	governments	to	con-
duct	national	and	regional	exercises	in	order	to	
assess	their	national	influenza	pandemic	prepared-
ness	plans.	The	guide	identifies	the	key	partners	
and	stakeholders	that	should	be	included	in	any	
exercise,	such	as:	
•  National and regional health authorities
•  Environmental officials
•  Veterinary authorities
•  Media relations and risk communications 
experts
•  Pharmaceutical industry representatives
•  Social services administrators; military and 
civil defense personnel
•  Forensic specialists
•  Health ethicists
•  NGO and private sector representatives
•  Government health, finance, transport, and 
civil affairs officials 
The	guide	also	defines	five	general	types	of	
emergency	exercises	(orientation,	drill,	tabletop,	
functional,	and	full-scale)	and	offers	sample	scenar-
ios	and	suggested	questions	for	discussion.	Several	
countries	have	conducted	simulation	exercises	to	
Fiji,	Japan,	Kiribati,	Laos,	Malaysia,	Marshall	Islands,	
Micronesia,	Mongolia,	Nauru,	New	Zealand,	Niue,	
Palau,	Papua	New	Guinea,	the	Philippines,	the	Repub-
lic	of	Korea,	Samoa,	Singapore,	Solomon	Islands,	Tonga,	
Tuvalu,	Vanuatu,	and	Vietnam.	The	WHO	has	another	
five	regional	offices:	Africa,	the	Americas,	Southeast	
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test	national	preparedness	plans	based	on	the	rec-
ommendations	of	WPRO.
Food and Agriculture 
Organization and World 
Organization for Animal Health
The	WHO	has	worked	closely	with	the	FAO	and	the	
OIE	to	coordinate	global	surveillance	and	response	
activities	to	animal	influenza	outbreaks	and	disease	
control.	In	April	2005,	the	FAO	and	OIE	launched	
OFFLU,	a	scientific	worldwide	network	to	support	
veterinary	services	in	the	control	of	avian	influen-
za.	OFFLU	encourages	scientists	from	around	the	
world	to	participate	in	the	network,	exchange	H5N1	
virus	strains	and	other	biological	materials,	and	
share	research	findings.	OFFLU	institute	partners	
and	veterinary	experts	from	Australia,	Brazil,	China,	
France,	Italy,	Japan,	the	Netherlands,	the	United	
Kingdom,	and	the	United	States	also	offer	training	
in	the	techniques	of	avian	influenza	isolation.	
In	July	2006,	the	WHO,	FAO,	and	OIE	jointly	
established	the	Global	Early	Warning	and	Response	
System	(GLEWS)	to	track	trans-boundary	animal	
diseases.	 The	 organizations	 also	 monitor	 the	
migratory	patterns	of	wild	water	birds	to	track	
the	spread	of	avian	influenza.	Outbreaks	of	H5N1	
in	Europe	and	the	Middle	East	in	late	2005	and	
early	 2006	 indicated	 that	 the	 H5N1	 virus	 was	
spreading	northwestward	and	was	not	restricted	
to	Southeast	Asia.	However,	the	legal	and	illegal	
trade	of	birds	also	contributed	to	the	spread	of	
H5N1.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 FAO	 warned	 that	 the	
recent	resurgence	of	the	virus	in	China	and	Russia	
suggests	that	the	pattern	may	be	repeating	since	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	are	crisscrossed	by	
overlapping	migration	flyways,	and	their	shorelines	
provide	sanctuary	for	wild	fowl	(Bloomberg.com	
2006).
Unfortunately,	many	cases	of	avian	influenza	
have	been	confirmed	in	countries	with	a	poor	public	
health	infrastructure	and	insufficient	veterinary	
services	 to	 manage	 the	 widespread	 outbreak.	
In	 November	 2005,	 the	 WHO,	 FAO,	 OIE,	 and	
World	Bank	co-sponsored	a	meeting	on	avian	and	
human	pandemic	influenza	in	Geneva,	Switzerland.	
Officials	 present	 at	 the	 meeting	 pledged	 to	
improve	veterinary	services,	including	culling	and	
vaccination;	strengthen	early	detection	and	rapid	
response	systems;	plan	and	test	rapid	containment	
activities,	strengthen	laboratory	and	health	systems	
capacity,	integrate	national	preparedness	 plans;	
conduct	global	pandemic	exercises;	and	improve	
communication	 networks.	 The	 current	 budget	
estimate	to	implement	these	activities	over	three	
years	is	approximately	$882	million,	up	from	the	
$476	million	estimate	presented	at	the	November	
2005	meeting	(FAO	2006a).	The	main	reason	for	
the	budget	increase	is	that	the	H5N1	virus	has	
expanded	its	geographic	reach	and	increased	the	
number	of	infected	and	at-risk	countries	since	the	
proposal	was	first	presented	in	late	2005.	
Within	the	global	framework	for	the	control	
of	trans-boundary	animal	diseases,	the	FAO	and	
OIE	developed	a	strategy	paper,	“A	Global	Strategy	
for	the	Progressive	Control	of	Highly	Pathogenic	
Avian	Influenza”	(FAO	and	OIE	2005),	to	serve	
as	a	road	map	for	diminishing	the	risk	of	human	
avian	influenza	by	controlling	the	spread	of	the	
virus	 from	 domestic	 poultry	 to	 humans.	 The	
strategy	paper	outlined	a	ten-year	plan	to	minimize	
the	risk	of	human	avian	influenza	by	stabilizing	
poultry	 production,	 restructuring	 regional	 and	
international	trade	in	poultry,	increasing	human	
and	food	safety,	and	improving	rural	development.	
Under	this	program,	the	FAO	released	another	
proposal	in	March	2006,	“Avian	Influenza	Control	
and	 Eradication:	 FAO’s	 Proposal	 for	 a	 Global	
Programme,”	in	collaboration	with	the	OIE	and	
World	Bank,	for	the	control	and	eradication	of	
avian	influenza	in	poultry	(2006b).	In	addition	
to	 proposing	 capacity	 building,	 training,	 and	
education	measures,	the	proposal	promoted	long-
term	prevention	strategies,	such	as	the	restructuring	
of	the	poultry	industry	to	improve	bio-security	and	
reduce	the	overall	risk	of	future	outbreaks.		 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge		|		Pandemic	Influenza	&	Response	Planning	
Global Initiative on Sharing 
Avian Influenza Data (GISAID)
In	August	2006,	a	group	of	leading	scientists	from	
around	the	world	announced	the	formation	of	a	
consortium	designed	to	improve	the	sharing	of	
avian	influenza	isolates	and	data	and	to	enhance	
WHO/FAO/OIE	efforts	to	better	understand	the	
spread,	evolution,	and	transmissibility	of	the	H5N1	
virus.	The	GISAID	consortium	is	open	to	all	scien-
tists	from	a	variety	of	disciplines,	such	as	animal	
and	human	virology,	bioinformatics,	epidemiolo-
gy,	and	intellectual	property,	provided	that	they	
agree	to	share	their	data,	analyze	findings	jointly,	
and	publish	results	collaboratively.	Data	collect-
ed	under	the	initiative	will	be	deposited	in	three	
publicly	available	databases	participating	in	the	
International	Nucleotide	Sequence	Database	Col-
laboration	within	six	months	of	final	analysis	and	
validation.
The World Bank
The	World	Bank	has	estimated	that	the	total	cost	of	
combating	the	spread	of	avian	influenza	in	affected	
countries	could	reach	$1	billion	over	the	next	three	
years,	not	including	the	cost	of	financing	human	
and	animal	vaccine	development,	purchasing	anti-
viral	medication,	and	compensating	farmers	for	lost	
income.	The	World	Bank	has	developed	two	mech-
anisms	to	help	affected	and	at-risk	countries	deal	
with	the	threat	of	avian	influenza	in	animals	and	
humans.	The	first	program,	announced	in	Novem-
ber	2005	at	the	Geneva	Conference,	is	a	global	
funding	program,	formally	referred	to	as	the	Glob-
al	Program	for	Avian	Influenza	(GPAI).	Under	this	
program,	the	World	Bank	has	agreed	to	provide	
$500	million	in	low-interest	loans,	credits,	or	grants	
to	countries	affected	by	H5N1	in	order	to	supple-
8	 	The	International	Nucleotide	Sequence	Database	
Collaboration	(INSD)	consists	of	the	DNA	Data	Bank	
of	Japan	(DDBJ),	the	European	Molecular	Biology	
Laboratory	Nucleotide	Sequence	Database	(EMBL),	
and	GenBank	(USA).	The	three	databases	regularly	
exchange	new	and	updated	data	on	DNA	and	RNA	
sequences.
ment	government	resources,	strengthen	veterinary	
resources,	and	assist	in	culling	and	animal	vacci-
nation	programs.	Over	twenty-five	countries	will	
receive	financing	under	this	program	by	the	end	
of	2006	(World	Bank	2006a).	
The	second	program	under	development	is	the	
multi-donor	Avian	and	Human	Influenza	Facili-
ty	(AHIF)	to	assist	countries	lacking	adequate	
resources	and	capacity	in	financing	their	nation-
al	preparedness	plans.	As	of	May	2006,	the	total	
funds	committed	to	this	program	were	$75	million.	
AHIF	donors	include	Australia,	China,	the	Euro-
pean	Commission,	Iceland,	South	Korea,	Russia,	
Slovenia,	and	the	United	Kingdom.	The	inaugu-
ral	meeting	of	the	AHIF	advisory	board	was	held	
in	June	2006.
Through	its	Global	Development	Learning	Net-
work	(GDLN),	the	World	Bank	also	offers	a	series	
of	inter-regional	distance	learning	seminars	on	
avian	and	human	influenza	planning	to	govern-
ments,	donors,	nonprofit	organizations,	technical	
agencies,	and	other	stakeholders.	The	first	seminar,	
held	on	July	12,	2006,	addressed	the	importance	
of	integrating	country	emergency	response	plans.	
The	second	videoconference	seminar,	sponsored	
by	the	U.S.	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Pre-
vention	on	September	26,	focused	on	strategic	
communications.	Country	representatives	shared	
their	national	response	and	communications	plans	
and	discussed	plans	to	establish	a	regional	health	
communications	network.	Participants	included	
representatives	from	Cambodia,	China,	Indonesia,	
Laos,	Japan,	Switzerland,	Thailand,	Turkey,	Viet-
nam,	the	United	States,	the	World	Bank,	UNICEF,	
WHO,	and	other	partners.
International Partnership on 
Avian and Pandemic Influenza
In	September	2005,	the	United	States	launched	the	
International	Partnership	on	Avian	and	Pandemic	
9	 	At	the	Beijing	donors’	conference	in	January	2006,	the	
World	Bank	pledged	$500	million.	It	is	unclear	if	this	
pledge	is	separate	from	the	$500	million	already	com-
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Influenza	to	coordinate	efforts	among	donor	and	
affected	countries,	mobilize	and	leverage	interna-
tional	resources,	and	build	the	local	capacity	to	
identify,	contain,	and	respond	to	an	influenza	
pandemic.	Representatives,	foreign	officers,	and	
health	and	agricultural	officials	from	eighty-eight	
countries	and	nine	international	organizations,	
including	the	WHO,	FAO,	OIE,	World	Bank,	Asian	
Pacific	 Economic	 Cooperation	 Forum	 (APEC),	
and	the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	
(ASEAN),	attended	the	implementation	meeting	in	
Washington,	D.C.,	in	October	2005.	At	this	meet-
ing,	participants	identified	three	priority	areas	for	
collaboration:	stockpiling	antiviral	drugs	and	sup-
plies,	developing	vaccines	and	distribution	plans,	
and	implementing	rapid	response	and	containment	
measures.	Participants	further	stressed	the	need	
to	develop	local	capacity-building	measures	since	
most	countries	lack	adequate	resources	to	rapidly	
identify,	contain,	and	respond	to	an	avian	influ-
enza	pandemic.	
In	January	2006,	the	government	of	China,	
the	European	Commission,	and	the	World	Bank,	
in	coordination	with	the	WHO,	FAO,	and	OIE,	co-
sponsored	the	International	Pledging	Conference	
on	Avian	and	Human	Influenza	in	Beijing.	At	this	
conference,	the	international	community	pledged	
$1.9	billion	in	aid	to	stockpile	protective	equipment,	
improve	 communication	 networks,	 and	 devel-
op	capacity-building	measures	such	as	laboratory	
diagnostics.	The	top	five	country	donors	were	the	
United	States	($334	million),	the	European	Union	
($265	million),	Japan	($159	million),	Australia	($56	
million),	and	Norway	($39	million)	(World	Bank	
2006b).	The	World	Bank	and	Asian	Development	
Bank	also	donated	$500	million	and	$468	mil-
lion,	respectively.	In	many	cases,	however,	donors	
specified	which	country,	region,	international	orga-
nization,	or	special	purpose	activity	would	receive	
the	pledge	money.	As	a	result,	only	a	few	million	
dollars	of	unrestricted	funds	were	made	available	to	
Africa,	the	Middle	East,	and	Latin	America.	More-
over,	the	total	amount	disbursed	to	date	of	the	$1.9	
billion	pledged	is	less	than	$350	million	(Nabarro	
2006).	Japan	is	among	the	few	countries	to	have	
disbursed	the	full	amount	that	it	promised	at	Bei-
jing.	Senior	ministers	and	officials	addressed	this	
funding	gap	in	Vienna	on	June	6-7,	2006	and	in	
Bamako,	Mali,	on	December	6-8,	2006.	In	prepa-
ration	for	the	Bamako	ministerial	conference,	the	
United	Nations	and	the	World	Bank	recommend-
ed	the	international	community	raise	an	additional	
$1.3	billion	to	$1.6	billion	to	fight	H5N1	over	the	
next	two	to	three	years	(Associated	Press	2006a).	
Despite	this	recommendation,	only	$476	million	
was	pledged	in	Bamako	(Associated	Press	2006c).
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
To	date,	the	H5N1	virus	has	affected	birds	in	nine	
and	humans	in	four	of	the	twenty-one-member	
Asia-Pacific	Economic	Cooperation	(APEC)	econ-
omies.0	In	order	to	contain	the	virus	and	minimize	
the	social	and	economic	costs,	APEC	leaders	have	
undertaken	a	number	of	collaborative	activities	to	
increase	public	awareness	and	strengthen	regional	
response	systems.	For	example,	the	APEC	Emerging	
Infections	Network	(EINet)	issues	biweekly	news	
alerts	and	news	briefs	to	APEC	members	on	avian	
influenza	and	other	emerging	infectious	diseas-
es	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region.	In	September	2006,	
APEC	leaders	met	in	Vietnam	at	the	APEC	Health	
Task	Force	Symposium	to	discuss	the	economic	
consequences	of	a	potential	pandemic	influenza	
and	identify	strategies	to	minimize	its	economic	
impact.	At	the	thirteenth	APEC	economic	lead-
ers’	meeting	in	Busan,	South	Korea,	in	November	
2005,	member	countries	adopted	the	APEC	Initia-
tive	on	Preparing	for	and	Mitigating	an	Influenza	
Pandemic,	which	committed	all	APEC	members	to	
develop	national	influenza	preparedness	plans	by	
November	2006.	Specifically,	the	initiative	called	
for	member	countries	to:
10	 	APEC	member	countries	include	Australia,	Brunei	
Darussalam,	Canada,	Chile,	China,	Hong	Kong	-	China,	
Indonesia,	Japan,	Korea,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	New	Zea-
land,	Papua	New	Guinea,	Peru,	Philippines,	Russia,	
Singapore,	Chinese	Taipei,	Thailand,	United	States,	
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•  Implement WHO recommendations
•  Enhance regional cooperation and collabora-
tion
•  Strengthen surveillance systems
•  Rapidly report on suspected and confirmed 
animal and human cases
•  Promote transparency
•  Assess economic impacts
•  Develop protocols for the continuity of busi-
ness, trade, and essential services
•  Identify regional experts
•  Improve communication and information-shar-
ing networks, including epidemiological 
data and laboratory samples 
An	effective	response	to	an	influenza	pandemic	
requires	an	integrative	and	comprehensive	plan	
that	streamlines	local	and	regional	efforts	between	
governments,	 international	 organizations,	 and	
representatives	from	the	veterinary,	agriculture,	
and	 human	 health	 sectors.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	
initiative	encouraged	APEC	member	countries	to	
conduct	regional	desktop	simulation	exercises	of	
a	human-to-human	transmission	of	a	pandemic	
influenza	virus	in	order	to	assess	the	effectiveness	
of	 international	 arrangements	 for	 emergency	
management,	regional	communication	networks,	
and	domestic	preparedness	plans.	Australia	and	
Singapore	 co-hosted	 a	 round-the-clock	 desktop	
simulation	 exercise	 on	 June	 7-8,	 2006	 (APEC	
Pandemic	Response	Exercise	2006),	to	test	regional	
communication	preparedness	during	a	pandemic.	
All	twenty-one	APEC	member	countries	participated	
in	the	simulation.	Eight	APEC	member	countries	
served	as	primary	participants,	including	Japan,	
China,	and	South	Korea.	The	exercise	lasted	twenty-
six	hours	across	eight	time	zones	and	included	calls	
from	New	Zealand	to	Washington,	D.C.	Singapore	
hosted	a	lessons-learned	workshop	in	August	2006.	
A	preliminary	report	containing	recommendations	
11	 	The	scenario	for	the	simulation	exercise:	a	passing	
passenger	cruise	ship	rescued	some	fishermen,	whose	
boat	had	capsized	and	who	were	suspected	of	having	
a	new	strain	of	influenza.
was	circulated	to	exercise	participants	for	comment	
in	November	2006.
At	the	APEC	Ministerial	Meeting	on	Avian	and	
Influenza	Pandemics	on	May	4-6,	2006,	APEC	
leaders	 adopted	 the	 APEC	 Action	 Plan	 on	 the	
Prevention	and	Response	to	Avian	and	Influenza	
Pandemics.	The	action	plan	focuses	regional	efforts	
on	five	principal	areas:	1)	improving	multi-sectoral	
cooperation	 and	 coordination,	 2)	 establishing	
best	 practices	 and	 common	 approaches	 to	 risk	
communications,	3)	mitigating	negative	effects	on	
agriculture	and	trade,	4)	working	with	the	private	
sector	to	ensure	continuity	of	business,	trade	and	
essential	services,	and	5)	strengthening	regional	
and	international	cooperation.	Together,	these	five	
principal	areas	aim	to	prevent	the	spread	of	the	
virus	from	animals	to	humans	by	restructuring	
farming	 techniques	 and	 improving	 industry	
standards	in	poor	countries.	The	private	sector,	
therefore,	has	a	critical	role	in	mitigating	the	social	
and	economic	costs	of	an	influenza	pandemic	in	
the	Asia-Pacific	region.	Specifically,	the	action	plan	
calls	for	the	private	sector	to	implement	disease	
control	strategies,	such	as	culling,	vaccinations,	
and	bio-security	and	movement	controls,	as	well	
as	to	develop	protocols	to	facilitate	the	continuity	
of	business,	essential	services,	and	trade.
Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations
The	 Association	 of	 Southeast	 Asian	 Nations	
(ASEAN)	has	created	a	number	of	institutional	
arrangements	to	improve	transnational	coordina-
tion	in	combating	the	spread	of	the	H5N1	virus	and	
hedge	the	risk	of	a	pandemic,	such	as	the	High-
ly	Pathogenic	Avian	Influenza	(HPAI)	Taskforce,	
the	ASEAN	Expert	Group	on	Communicable	Dis-
eases,	the	ASEAN	Animal	Health	Trust	Fund,	and	
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the	Republic	of	Korea)	Emerging	Infectious	Dis-
eases	Programme.2	
The	HPAI	Taskforce	was	established	to	help	
in	the	implementation	of	definite	measures	and	
areas	of	cooperation	to	control	HPAI	in	the	ani-
mal	health	sector.	In	September	2005,	the	HPAI	
Taskforce	proposed	the	Regional	Framework	for	
Control	and	Eradication	of	Highly	Pathogenic	Avian	
Influenza,	which	directs	eight	strategic	areas	on	
the	prevention,	control,	and	eradication	of	HPAI.	
The	HPAI	Taskforce	also	assigned	Thailand,	Malay-
sia,	Indonesia,	the	Philippines,	and	Singapore	to	
coordinate	the	eight	strategic	areas,	which	include	
disease	 surveillance	 and	 alert	 systems,	 effec-
tive	containment	measures,	stamping-out	policy	
and	strategic	vaccination,	enhanced	diagnostic	
capabilities,	establishment	of	disease-free	zones,	
harmonized	information	sharing,	ASEAN	emer-
gency	preparedness	planning,	and	public	awareness	
and	communication	campaigns.	The	total	funding	
requested	at	the	International	Pledging	Conference	
on	Avian	and	Human	Influenza	in	Beijing	to	exe-
cute	the	proposed	HPAI	Taskforce	projects	was	
$94.7	million;	however,	ASEAN	received	only	$47.4	
million	for	all	projects	proposed	(ASEAN	2006).	
As	for	the	public	health	sector,	China,	Japan,	
and	the	Republic	of	Korea	agreed	to	create	the	
ASEAN+3	Emerging	Infectious	Diseases	Program	
to	help	improve	the	institutional	capacity	of	the	
ASEAN	Disease	Surveillance	Network,	enhance	
national	and	regional	laboratory	and	epidemiolog-
ical	surveillance,	develop	early	warning	systems,	
and	improve	rapid	response	plans.	Moreover,	at	
the	ASEAN	summit	in	Kuala	Lumpur,	Malaysia,	in	
December	2005,	ASEAN	leaders	agreed	to	establish	
a	regional	pandemic	influenza	vaccine	stockpile	to	
assist	the	most	affected	countries	in	the	region	in	
controlling	the	disease.	Malaysia	also	announced	
plans	to	set	up	a	WHO	headquarters	to	help	coor-
dinate	regional	plans	to	contain	the	spread	of	the	
H5N1	virus.
12	 	ASEAN	member	countries	include	Brunei	Darussalam,	
Cambodia,	Indonesia,	Laos,	Malaysia,	Myanmar,	the	
Philippines,	Singapore,	Thailand,	and	Vietnam.
Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
In	May	2006,	Japan	donated	$47	million	to	launch	
the	 Japan-ASEAN	 Integration	 Fund	 (JAIF)	 to	
strengthen	influenza	surveillance	and	develop	
containment	measures	among	ASEAN	members,	
including	the	large-scale	administration	of	antiviral	
agents	and	implementation	of	quarantine	and	travel	
restrictions.	Through	this	fund,	the	government	
of	Japan	donated	five	hundred	thousand	courses	
of	Tamiflu®	and	seven	hundred	thousand	sets	of	
medical	protective	equipment	to	frontline	avian	
influenza	fighters	(TMCnet	2006).	Before	Japan	
made	this	donation,	the	only	stockpile	of	antiviral	
agents	and	protective	medical	equipment	reserved	
for	international	use	were	in	the	United	States	and	
Switzerland.	Although	several	countries	are	creat-
ing	national	strategic	stockpiles,	an	international	
stockpile	reserved	for	Southeast	Asia	in	Singapore	
will	serve	as	a	safety	net	to	countries	in	the	region	
unable	to	meet	national	demands	in	the	event	of	
a	pandemic.
Asian Development Bank
As	part	of	the	$1.9	billion	pledged	at	the	January	
2006	international	conference	in	Beijing,	the	Asian	
Development	Bank	(ADB)	committed	$470	million	
(roughly	$70	million	in	grants	and	$400	million	in	
loans)	to	support	regional	capacity	development.	
As	part	of	this	pledge,	ADB,	in	association	with	
the	WHO,	OIE,	FAO,	and	ASEAN,	approved	a	$38	
million	grant	project	to	address	the	risk	of	avian	
human	influenza	in	the	Pacific	region,	improve	
regional	collaboration	among	technical	agencies,	
and	establish	an	emergency	fund	($14.5	million)	to	
help	countries	fill	funding	gaps.	Japan	contribut-
ed	$10	million	to	this	grant	project.	In	addition	to	
regional	grant	assistance	projects,	ADB	has	funded	
projects	at	the	country	level,	such	as	a	$1.2	million	
grant	to	provide	technical	assistance	and	improve	
13	 	The	$47	million	donation	is	part	of	the	$159	million	
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ence	in	Beijing.0	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge		|		Pandemic	Influenza	&	Response	Planning	
national	surveillance	and	response	systems	in	the	
Philippines,	Indonesia,	and	Malaysia.	
East Asia Summit
The	inaugural	meeting	of	the	East	Asia	Summit	
(EAS)	immediately	followed	the	ASEAN	summit	in	
Kuala	Lumpur	in	December	2005.	At	this	meeting	
EAS	leaders	endorsed	the	East	Asia	Summit	Decla-
ration	on	Avian	Influenza	Prevention,	Control	and	
Response,	which	committed	ASEAN	member	coun-
tries,	Australia,	China,	India,	Japan,	the	Republic	
of	Korea,	New	Zealand,	and	participating	coun-
tries	of	the	EAS	to:
•  Eradicate and contain avian influenza
•  Ensure rapid, accurate, and transparent risk 
communications
•  Establish information sharing protocols
•  Create a regional network of stockpiles of anti-
viral drugs and vaccines
•  Prepare avian influenza pandemic prepared-
ness plans backed by national legislation
•  Strengthen  institutional  capacities  and 
increase bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tion in areas such as surveillance, research 
and development, risk communications, 
and vaccine productionThe Pandemic Influenza Challenge	 
National Strategies
Although	the	WHO	is	the	central	actor	for	coordinating	the	global	response	
to	an	avian	influenza	outbreak,	its	limited	budget	competes	with	other	health	
programs	to	treat	a	variety	of	illnesses,	such	as	malaria,	resurging	tuberculo-
sis	and	poliomyelitis,	the	global	AIDS	pandemic,	and	other	respiratory	and	
infectious	diseases.	Given	the	current	health	challenges,	as	well	as	increas-
ing	demands	to	tackle	avian	influenza	and	epidemic	response	planning,	the	
WHO	proposed	program	budget	for	2006	and	2007	was	$3.3	billion,	a	17.3	
percent	increase	over	the	previous	two-year	period	(WHO	2006f).	Howev-
er,	the	fifty-eighth	World	Health	Assembly	only	appropriated	$995	million	
to	the	WHO	for	all	of	its	health	programs,	forcing	the	organization	to	rely	
on	voluntary	contributions	to	fill	the	widening	gap.	“We	need	to	remember	
that	the	WHO	budget	is	roughly	the	size	of	a	medium-sized	hospital	in	the	
United	States,”	noted	a	workshop	participant.	“We	cannot	expect	the	WHO	
to	address	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	alone.	In	order	to	confront	the	
emerging	threat	of	an	avian	and	human	influenza,	we	need	to	prepare	at	the	
local	level,	understand	what	each	country	can	and	cannot	do,	integrate	our	
plans,	and	collaborate	under	the	WHO	flag.”	
United States
According	to	the	CDC,	approximately	200,000	people	are	hospitalized	each	
year	in	the	United	States	from	flu	complications,	36,000	of	whom	die	from	
the	illness.	On	average,	the	seasonal	flu	costs	the	U.S.	economy	about	$12	bil-
lion	per	year	in	direct	medical	costs	and	loss	of	productivity	(Garrett	2005).	
While	these	costs	are	significant,	the	health	and	economic	impact	of	a	human-
to-human	outbreak	of	the	H5N1	virus	in	the	United	States	could	be	far	more		 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge		|		National	Strategies
disastrous,	potentially	overwhelming	health	and	
medical	facilities,	killing	hundreds	of	thousands	of	
people,	hospitalizing	millions,	and	generating	bil-
lions	of	dollars	in	economic	losses.	One	1999	study	
calculated	that	even	with	vaccine-based	interven-
tions,	a	pandemic	influenza	in	the	United	States	
could	result	in	89,000	to	207,000	deaths,	314,000	
to	734,000	hospitalizations,	18	million	to	42	million	
outpatient	visits,	20	million	to	47	million	related	
illnesses	(Meltzer,	Cox,	and	Fukuda	1999).	The	
present	value	of	economic	losses	associated	with	
this	level	of	death	and	illness	for	the	United	States	
is	$100	billion	to	$200	billion	(in	2004	dollars)	
(World	Bank	2005).
In	 November	 2005,	 the	 U.S.	 government	
unveiled	the	National	Strategy	for	Pandemic	Influ-
enza,	to	guide	national	preparedness	and	response	
plans	in	order	to	prevent	or	limit	the	spread	of	H5N1	
to	and	within	the	United	States,	sustain	critical	
infrastructure,	and	mitigate	the	potential	eco-
nomic	and	social	impact	of	the	virus	on	the	U.S.	
and	international	community	(Homeland	Security	
Council	2005).	The	twelve-page	document	describ-
ing	the	strategy	centers	the	federal	government’s	
responsibilities	on	three	pillars:	1)	preparedness	
and	communication,	2)	surveillance	and	detec-
tion,	and	3)	response	and	containment.	Specific	
tasks	include	plans	to	expand	the	in-country	med-
ical,	veterinary,	and	scientific	capacity;	develop	
state	and	local	preparedness	plans;	integrate	pri-
vate	sector	and	critical	infrastructure	entities	into	
the	planning	process;	coordinate	efforts	with	mul-
tilateral	and	regional	organizations;	produce	and	
stockpile	vaccines	and	antiviral	medications;	and	
design	effective	risk	communication	campaigns.	
Recognizing	that	no	single	entity	can	prevent	or	
mitigate	the	impact	of	a	pandemic,	the	National	
Strategy	for	Pandemic	Influenza	underscores	the	
critical	role	of	the	federal	and	state	authorities,	the	
nonprofit	and	multilateral	institutions,	the	private	
sector,	and	individuals	to	prepare	for	the	emerging	
threat	of	an	influenza	pandemic.	
The	U.S.	government	released	the	implemen-
tation	plan	for	the	national	strategy	for	pandemic	
influenza	(Homeland	Security	Council	2006)	in	
May	2006.	Specifically,	the	implementation	plan	
outlines	the	U.S.	government	response	at	each	
pandemic	alert	phase	and	details	the	roles	and	
responsibilities	of	the	federal	and	local	governments,	
law	enforcement	agencies,	and	critical-infrastruc-
ture	and	private-sector	entities.	Actions	outlined	to	
prevent	and	contain	H5N1	outbreaks	include	the	
following:	
•  Guidance on government continuity (e.g., 
sustain  infrastructure,  modify  laws  to 
facilitate response and monetary policy 
to mitigate economic impact)
•  Human and animal health protection (e.g., 
cull infected flocks, activate pandemic 
plans, and distribute personal protective 
equipment, antiviral medications, and vac-
cines)
•  Transportation and border control (e.g., sus-
tain  critical  transportation  services, 
develop screening protocols, and identify 
the operational feasibility and the medical, 
social, and economic challenges of border 
closure)
•  Public safety and security measures (e.g., joint 
training and coordination of the National 
Guard, law enforcement, legal authorities, 
and public health officials)
•  Public and private sector continuity plans (e.g., 
community containment measures, com-
munication planning, and identification of 
key stakeholders)
	The	implementation	plan	also	directs	the	U.S.	
government	to	coordinate	surveillance	and	rapid	
response	efforts	with	international	partners	given	
the	limited	global	capacity	to	detect	and	contain	
avian	influenza.	Moreover,	the	Departments	of	
State	and	Homeland	Security	are	designated	as	
the	lead	agencies	for	coordinating	an	international	
and	domestic	response,	respectively,	to	pandem-
ic	influenza.
In	 March	 2006,	 the	 Department	 of	 State	
established	the	Avian	Influenza	Action	Group	to	
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(WHO,	FAO,	and	OIE)	and	key	federal	agencies,	
including	the	Department	of	Defense,	the	U.S.	
Agency	for	International	Development	(USAID),	
and	the	CDC.	The	action	group	oversees	U.S.	
participation	in	the	International	Partnership	on	
Avian	and	Pandemic	Influenza.	Ambassador	John	
E.	Lange	serves	as	senior	coordinator	of	the	action	
group	and	is	the	Department	of	State’s	special	rep-
resentative	on	avian	and	pandemic	influenza.
To	date,	the	U.S.	government	has	committed	
a	tremendous	amount	of	resources	at	home	and	
abroad	to	combat	the	emerging	threat	of	an	influ-
enza	pandemic.	Shortly	after	announcing	the	
National	Strategy	for	Pandemic	Influenza,	Pres-
ident	Bush	requested	$7.1	billion	in	aid	to	fund	
domestic	and	international	avian	flu	initiatives	
over	several	years.	Congress	approved	$3.8	billion	
and	$2.3	billion	for	fiscal	years	2006	and	2007,	
respectively.	At	the	2006	International	Pledging	
Conference	on	Avian	and	Human	Influenza	in	Bei-
jing,	the	United	States	committed	approximately	
$334	million	in	grants	and	technical	assistance	to	
support	international	organizations	and	countries	
threatened	by	H5N1.	This	support	will	fund	pub-
lic	outreach	and	communication	campaigns,	the	
development	of	national	preparedness	plans,	labo-
ratory	diagnostics	and	supplies,	and	the	stockpiling	
of	antiviral	medications,	protective	equipment,	and	
other	emergency	health	commodities.	At	the	ple-
nary	session	of	the	International	Partnership	on	
Avian	and	Pandemic	Influenza	in	Vienna	on	June	
7,	2006,	the	United	States	committed	an	addition-
al	$28	million.
In	collaboration	with	the	WHO,	FAO,	OIE,	and	
other	partners,	U.S.	federal	agencies	have	investi-
gated	animal	and	human	cases	of	avian	influenza	
around	the	world	and	funded	activities	to	support	
national	preparedness	and	emergency	plans	in	
over	forty-six	countries.	USAID,	along	with	the	
Departments	of	State,	Agriculture,	Defense,	and	
Health	and	Human	Services	(HHS),	has	provided	
material	and	technical	assistance	to	affected	or	
at-risk	countries,	including	laboratory	equipment,	
reagents,	and	over	thirty-six	thousand	sets	of	pro-
tective	equipment	to	first	responders,	healthcare	
workers,	veterinarians,	and	field	technicians.	More-
over,	USAID	has	funded	communication	and	public	
awareness	campaigns	in	over	thirty-four	countries	
and	sent	scientists,	veterinarians,	and	emergen-
cy	personnel	to	help	build	laboratories,	diagnose	
avian	influenza,	and	advise	on	poultry	surveillance	
and	vaccination	programs.	In	June	2006,	USAID	
awarded	a	$5	million	grant	to	develop	a	global	net-
work	to	monitor	the	role	of	migratory	birds	and	
track	the	spread	of	avian	influenza.	The	Global	
Avian	Influenza	Network	for	Surveillance	(GAINS),	
directed	by	the	Wildlife	Conservation	Society,	will	
follow	key	migratory	routes	and	analyze	laboratory	
samples	to	identify	genetic	mutations	of	the	virus	
in	birds.	The	U.S.	CDC	contributed	an	additional	
$1	million	to	this	initiative.
Recognizing	that	human	health	protection	is	
one	of	the	primary	means	to	prevent	the	rapid	and	
lethal	spread	of	avian	influenza,	HHS	has	taken	the	
lead	in	outlining	public	health	and	medical	support	
preparedness	plans	to	reduce	the	health	impact,	
including	morbidity	and	death,	in	the	event	of	a	
pandemic.	HHS	also	manages	a	U.S.	government	
website	on	avian	influenza	(http://www.pandemic-
flu.gov	or	http://www.avianflu.gov),	which	serves	
as	a	media	outlet	for	information	on	global	out-
breaks,	business,	school,	and	healthcare	response	
activities,	as	well	as	providing	information	on	feder-
al,	state,	and	international	pandemic	preparedness	
plans	and	activities.
In	November	2005,	HHS	published	the	HHS	
Pandemic	Influenza	Plan	to	serve	as	a	blueprint	
for	all	HHS	pandemic	response	activities	and	pro-
vide	public	health	guidance	to	federal,	state,	and	
local	policy	makers	and	health	officials.	Part	1	of	
the	HHS	Pandemic	Influenza	Plan	reviews	the	
WHO,	federal,	and	public	health	operation	plans	
in	place,	such	as	domestic	vaccine	and	production	
capacity	plans,	antiviral	medications	distribution	
plans,	and	epidemiological	and	clinical	research	
activities.	Part	2	outlines	guidance	plans	for	state	
and	local	health	departments	in	eleven	areas:	
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planning,	infection	control,	clinical	guidelines,	
vaccine	distribution	and	use,	antiviral	distribution	
and	use,	community	disease	control	and	preven-
tion,	travel-related	risks	of	disease,	public	health	
communications,	and	workforce	support.	Part	3	
is	under	development	and	will	outline	the	opera-
tional	plans	of	key	agencies	within	HHS,	such	as	
the	CDC,	the	Office	of	the	Surgeon	General,	the	
National	Vaccine	Program	Office,	and	the	Office	
of	Global	Health	Affairs.
Of	the	$3.8	billion	Congress	appropriated	in	fis-
cal	year	2006	to	fund	preparations	for	pandemic	
planning,	the	U.S.	government	allocated	$3.3	billion	
to	HHS	for	influenza	monitoring	and	surveillance,	
vaccine	development,	antiviral	stockpiling,	state	
and	local	preparedness,	and	communication	plan-
ning.	HHS	allocated	the	majority	of	the	$3.3	billion	
for	vaccine	research	and	development	activities	
($1.8	billion)	and	for	the	stockpiling	of	antivi-
ral	medications	($731	million)	to	treat	at	least	25	
percent	of	the	U.S.	population,	or	roughly	seventy-
five	million	people.	As	of	March	2006,	the	United	
States	strategic	national	stockpile	contained	nearly	
twenty-six	million	courses	of	Tamiflu®	and	Relen-
za®	(twenty-two	million	courses	of	Tamiflu®	and	
four	million	of	Relenza®),	with	plans	to	acquire	a	
total	of	eighty-one	million	treatment	courses	(sixty-
four	million	and	sixteen	million	treatment	courses	
of	Tamiflu®	and	Relenza®,	respectively)	by	2008	
(CIDRAP	News	2006).
In	2005,	Michael	O.	Leavitt,	secretary	of	health	
and	human	services,	awarded	a	government	contract	
to	Sanofi	Pasteur	and	Chiron	Corporation,	valued	
at	$100	million	and	$62.5	million,	respectively,	to	
advance	vaccine-manufacturing	technologies	and	
produce	an	experimental	avian	influenza	vaccine.	
In	May	2006,	HHS	awarded	additional	contracts	to	
Solvay	Pharmaceuticals,	GlaxoSmithKline,	Novar-
tis,	MedImmune,	and	Dynport	Vaccine,	worth	$1	
billion,	to	produce	cell-based	vaccines	to	target	both	
seasonal	and	avian	influenza.	The	U.S.	government	
plans	to	stockpile	enough	pre-pandemic	vaccines	to	
immunize	twenty	million	people	against	influenza	
strains	that	present	a	pandemic	threat.	Moreover,	
since	40	percent	of	the	current	annual	domes-
tic	supply	of	influenza	vaccines	is	manufactured	
abroad,	all	of	which	will	most	likely	be	unavailable	
in	the	event	of	a	pandemic,	the	U.S.	government	
plans	to	expand	the	domestic	vaccine	manufactur-
ing	capacity	for	the	production	of	enough	vaccines	
to	treat	the	U.S.	population	within	six	months	after	
the	onset	of	a	pandemic	(Homeland	Security	Coun-
cil	2006,	104).	
On	September	26,	2006,	the	U.S.	House	of	Rep-
resentatives	passed	the	Biodefense	and	Pandemic	
Vaccine	and	Drug	Development	Act	of	2006	(H.R.	
5333),	which	appropriated	$160	million	to	HHS	for	
fiscal	years	2006	and	2007	and	authorized	HHS	
to	create	the	Biomedical	Advanced	Research	and	
Development	Authority	(BARDA)	to	oversee	the	
research	and	development	of	products	to	defend	
against	bioterrorism	and	pandemic	influenza	and	
provide	technical	assistance	to	drug	manufactur-
ers	(Congressional	Budget	Office	2006).	The	bill	
also	established	the	National	Biodefense	Science	
Board	to	provide	scientific	guidance	to	HHS	on	
issues	involving	chemical,	biological,	radiological,	
and	nuclear	agents.
Japan
Assuming	that	the	H5N1	virus	infects	25	percent	
of	the	Japanese	population	over	eight	weeks,	the	
government	of	Japan	estimates	that	13	million	to	
25	million	Japanese	will	visit	medical	facilities	dur-
ing	an	influenza	pandemic,	with	approximately	
530,000	to	2	million	hospitalizations	and	170,000	
to	640,000	fatalities,	depending	on	the	severity	
of	the	disease	(Government	of	Japan	2005,	3).	The	
final	health	impact	of	the	virus	will	depend	on	the	
preparedness	and	response	systems	of	the	Japanese	
government,	including	the	development	and	dis-
tribution	of	vaccines	and	antiviral	medications	to	
the	general	population.	The	National	Institute	of	
Infectious	Diseases	in	Japan	is	one	of	the	four	WHO	
collaborating	centers	around	the	world	studying	
the	disease.	In	addition	to	conducting	epidemiolog-
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and	recombinant	viruses	to	laboratories	and	vac-
cine	producers,	the	National	Institute	of	Infectious	
Diseases	is	responsible	for	providing	technical	assis-
tance	for	the	development	of	national	and	regional	
health	programs.	Moreover,	Japan	has	introduced	
new	communicable-disease-control	measures	and	
revised	existing	legislation	on	infectious-disease	
prevention,	including	the	Law	Concerning	the	Pre-
vention	of	Infectious	Diseases	and	Medical	Care	
for	Patients	of	Infections	(herein	referred	to	as	the	
Infectious	Diseases	Law).	The	Infectious	Diseas-
es	Law	was	revised	recently	to	promote	measures	
against	new	infectious	diseases	and	incorporate	
provisions	concerning	the	development	and	stock-
piling	of	antiviral	medications	and	vaccines.	The	
law	categorizes	the	different	types	of	infectious	
diseases	based	upon	their	infectiousness	and	seri-
ousness	of	symptoms.	Since	June	2006,	human	
cases	of	H5N1	have	been	classified	as	a	specially	
designated	infectious	disease,	requiring	infected	
patients	to	be	admitted	to	a	designated	infectious-
disease	hospital	until	fully	recovered.	
The	government	of	Japan	established	the	Inter-
ministerial	Avian	Influenza	Committee	to	enhance	
response	planning	and	coordination	among	the	
relevant	government	bodies,	which	include	the	
Cabinet	Secretariat,	the	Ministries	of	Foreign	
Affairs,	Finance,	Environment,	Transport,	and	
Health,	the	Japan	Defense	Agency,	Coast	Guard,	
National	Police	Association,	and	Small	and	Medi-
um	Enterprise	Agency.	The	Japanese	government	
also	created	the	Headquarters	for	Pandemic	Influ-
enza	Countermeasures,	chaired	by	the	Ministry	
of	Health,	Labor,	and	Welfare	(MHLW),	to	facil-
itate	interagency	collaboration,	adopt	influenza	
response	policies,	and	coordinate	efforts	with	rel-
evant	international	and	local	organizations,	such	
as	health	care	and	animal	health	workers,	medi-
cal	institutions,	the	mass	media,	and	private	and	
nonprofit	corporations.	The	MHLW	also	heads	the	
Expert	Committee	on	New	Influenza,	whose	mem-
bers	are	health	and	policy	experts.
In	November	2005,	Japan	released	the	Pan-
demic	Influenza	Preparedness	Action	Plan	of	the	
Japanese	Government,	which	adheres	closely	to	the	
WHO	Global	Influenza	Preparedness	Plan.	Japan’s	
Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	Action	Plan	also	
mirrors	the	six	pandemic	alert	phases	of	the	WHO	
Global	Influenza	Preparedness	Plan,	but	further	
distinguishes	each	alert	phase	to	reflect	whether	
an	outbreak	has	occurred	in	Japan.	Regardless	of	
where	an	outbreak	occurs,	the	Pandemic	Influenza	
Preparedness	Action	Plan	assigns	responsibilities	to	
government	bodies	and	health	and	animal	experts	
at	each	pandemic	alert	phase.	These	responsibil-
ities	include:	
•  Issuing alerts to citizens and overseas travel-
ers
•  Terminating the importation of birds from 
nations or regions with outbreaks
•  Disposing of infected animals and restrict-
ing the movement surrounding poultry 
flocks
•  Strengthening the capacity of designated med-
ical facilities
•  Initiating cluster surveillance at schools and 
workplaces
•  Instituting quarantine measures
•  Distributing antiviral medications and proto-
type vaccines 
In	addition,	the	government’s	preparedness	plan	
directs	the	Inter-ministerial	Avian	Influenza	Com-
mittee,	headed	by	the	MHLW,	to	coordinate	the	
exchange	of	information	among	government	bod-
ies,	ministries,	prefectures,	and	health	and	policy	
experts	in	surveillance,	prevention	and	contain-
ment,	medical	response,	risk	communication,	and	
international	response.	The	minister	of	health,	
labor,	and	welfare	is	responsible	for	directing	the	
country’s	response	to	avian	influenza	through	pan-
demic	alert	phase	4.	After	that	point,	the	prime	
minister	will	step	in	to	lead	Japan’s	response.	
On	September	12,	2006,	the	government	of	
Japan	conducted	a	tabletop	exercise	with	central	
government	agencies	and	ministries	to	test	the	
14	 	Additional	information	is	available	at	the	MHLW	web-
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country’s	national	preparedness	plan	for	a	pan-
demic	alert	phase	4	and	phase	5	scenario.	The	
government	also	plans	to	conduct	an	additional	
drill	with	local	government	participants	for	a	pan-
demic	alert	phase	6	scenario.
Although	it	is	unclear	how	many	doses	of	antiviral	
medications	the	Japanese	government	has	stockpiled	
to	date,	Japan	hopes	to	stockpile	enough	Tamiflu®	
and	Relenza®	to	treat	25	million	and	750,000	peo-
ple,	respectively.	During	a	regular	influenza	season,	
Chugai	Pharmaceutical	Co.	imports	enough	Tamif-
lu®	to	treat	12.5	million	people.	Since	approximately	
4	million	doses	on	average	remain	at	the	end	of	a	reg-
ular	flu	season,	the	government	will	need	to	stock-
pile	an	additional	21	million	doses	in	order	to	meet	
its	25-million-dose	target	(Asahi	Shimbun	2005).	
The	Japanese	Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	
Action	Plan	ordered	Japan’s	prefectures	to	stockpile	
10.5	million	doses,	leaving	the	central	government	
responsible	for	the	remaining	10.5	million	doses.	
As	of	November	2006,	the	central	government	had	
stockpiled	7.5	million	doses	of	Tamiflu®,	and	the	
prefectures	plan	to	purchase	enough	doses	to	treat	
5.25	million	by	May	2007	(Associated	Press	2006b).	
As	for	the	antiviral	medication	Relenza®,	approx-
imately	150,000	doses	remain	in	Japan	at	the	end	
of	a	regular	flu	season,	600,000	doses	short	of	the	
target	amount.	The	Japanese	pharmaceutical	com-
pany,	Sankyo	Co.	Ltd.,	received	a	$5.6	million	grant	
from	the	National	Institutes	of	Health	(NIH)	in	the	
United	States	to	begin	development	of	an	advanced	
version	of	Relenza®.
To	 date,	 Japan	 has	 committed	 substantial	
resources	to	assist	the	international	community,	
and	Asian	countries	in	particular,	with	the	fight	
against	avian	and	human	influenza.	On	January	
12-13,	2006,	Japan	co-hosted	an	international	con-
ference	with	the	WHO	to	discuss	the	necessary	
measures	for	early	containment	of	an	avian	and	
human	influenza	outbreak.	A	week	later	at	the	
international	donors’	conference	in	Beijing,	Japan	
pledged,	and	has	since	disbursed,	approximately	
$158.97	million	to	assist	countries	with	stockpil-
ing	antiviral	medications,	surveillance,	research,	
communication	campaigns,	and	training.	Japan’s	
pledge	was	targeted	as	follows:
•  $7 million to launch the Japan-ASEAN 
Integration Fund to strengthen influen-
za surveillance and develop containment 
measures among ASEAN members 
•  $ million to the WHO and United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to support a 
communication campaign in rural areas 
and provide high-risk groups with influ-
enza vaccines 
•  $2 million to the WHO to enhance its sur-
veillance capacity and support antiviral 
medication distribution planning 
•  $ million to the OIE and FAO for the devel-
opment of national veterinary services, 
a notification system, and contingency 
plans 
•  $20 million to support joint research between 
four Japanese infectious-disease institutes 
and their counterparts in Vietnam, Thai-
land, and China 
•  $20 million to the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank to fund projects that 
assist developing countries with the formu-
lation and implementation of their national 
preparedness plans 
Japan	also	plans	to	provide	developing	countries	
with	necessary	laboratory	equipment	and	to	train	
over	one	hundred	professionals	from	Asia,	partic-
ularly	health	workers,	animal	health	experts,	and	
researchers,	in	order	to	assist	governments	with	
building	the	local	capacity	to	prepare	for	and	
respond	to	an	influenza	pandemic.
Republic of Korea
Health	 and	 policy	 experts	 estimate	 that	 the	
potential	disease	burden	of	a	pandemic	influen-
za	in	South	Korea	could	overwhelm	its	resources,	
paralyze	the	economy,	and	cause	severe	health	
consequences.	Assuming	a	20	percent	to	40	per-
cent	attack	rate,	workshop	presenters	from	South	
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generate	6	million	to	12	million	outpatient	visits,	
157,000	to	315,000	hospitalizations,	and	36,000	to	
73,000	deaths.	To	prevent	this,	South	Korea	has	
taken	a	number	of	steps	to	mitigate	the	negative	
consequences	of	an	avian	influenza	outbreak	and	
enhance	the	country’s	capacity	to	respond	to	the	
emerging	public	health	threat.	In	the	past	few	years,	
the	country	has	adopted	legal	frameworks	and	
introduced	manuals	for	pandemic	preparedness,	
such	as	the	Framework Act on the Manage-
ment of Disasters and Safety, Basic Guideline 
for National Crisis Management	(Presidential	
Decree	no.	124,	July	2004),	Standard Manual for 
National Crisis Management	(September	2004),	
Practical Manual for Communicable Disease 
Response	(September	2005),	and	Measures and 
Activities to be taken by Government Agencies/
Institutes in Crisis Settings	(November	2005).	
Moreover,	legal	provisions	for	medical	service	and	
communicable-disease	control,	such	as	the	Quar-
antine	Act,	the	Emergency	Medical	Service	Act,	
and	the	Communicable	Disease	Prevention	Act,	
provide	the	legal	basis	for	pandemic	preparedness	
and	response.	In	anticipation	of	an	emerging	influ-
enza	crisis,	South	Korea	has	attempted	to:
•  Integrate the national crisis and communica-
ble disease management systems
•  Train and educate personnel
•  Stockpile antiviral medications, personal 
protective equipment, and pre-pandemic 
vaccines
•  Strengthen critical infrastructure to ensure 
the continuity of central and local govern-
ment, businesses, schools, military, and 
other essential services 
•  Build capacity for vaccine production
•  Enhance infrastructure for risk communica-
tion
The	ROK’s	Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	
and	Response	Plan,	introduced	in	2006,	assigned	
responsibilities	to	government	bodies	and	health	
and	animal	experts	in	seven	areas:	1)	command,	
control,	and	coordination,	2)	risk	communication,	
3)	surveillance,	4)	healthcare	service,	5)	vaccines	
and	antiviral	medications,	6)	public	health	mea-
sures,	and	7)	education	and	research	(Ministry	of	
Health	and	Welfare	2006).	
According	to	the	pandemic	influenza	response	
plan,	the	command	and	control	system	during	a	
national	crisis	comprises	the	following:
•  The National Security Council, headed by the 
president
•  The Central Crisis Management Committee, 
headed by the prime minister
•  The Head Office for Crisis Management, head-
ed by the minister of health and welfare 
(MOHW)
•  The Head Office for Communicable Disease 
Management, headed by the Korea Cen-
ter for Disease Control and Prevention 
(KCDC)
•  The local government offices for Crisis Man-
agement  and  Communicable  Disease 
Management. 
In	addition,	the	Crisis	Assessment	Committee	
and	the	Pandemic	Advisory	Committee,	which	
include	officials	from	the	MOHW	and	KCDC	(a	
division	of	the	MHLW),	are	the	two	main	deci-
sion-making	organs	during	a	crisis.	Although	the	
MOHW	technically	decides	when	and	how	to	
respond	to	an	influenza	outbreak,	the	National	
Security	Council	and	the	Central	Crisis	Manage-
ment	Commitment	officially	trigger	and	execute	
the	national	influenza	response	plan,	particularly	
in	a	phase	6	scenario.	
Actions	outlined	in	the	pandemic	influenza	
response	plan	include	guidance	on	the	development	
of	transparent	and	effective	risk	communication	
tools	in	order	for	pubic	health	officials	to	convey	
complex	information	clearly	and	simply	to	govern-
ment	officials,	human	and	animal	health	workers,	
media	outlets,	the	private	sector,	and	individuals.	
With	regard	to	surveillance	strategies,	the	gov-
ernment	plans	to	enhance	its	many	surveillance	
systems,	some	of	which	suffer	from	poor	utiliza-
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in	South	Korea	include	the	rumor	surveillance	
system,	the	infection	specialist	network,	the	emer-
gency-room-based	syndrome	surveillance	system,	
the	laboratory-based	surveillance,	and	the	sentinel	
surveillance	system,	which	tracks	influenza	cases	
and	school	absenteeism.	Finally,	the	Korea	Influen-
za	Surveillance	Scheme	(KISS)	monitors	influenza	
activities	to	detect	epidemics	and	it	contributes	to	
the	development	of	influenza	control	measures	and	
influenza	vaccines.	In	addition,	KISS	issues	weekly	
reports	on	laboratory	data	and	clinic	admissions	for	
influenza-like	illnesses	(ILI)	and	pneumonia.	The	
government	plans	to	establish	a	new	surveillance	
system	to	monitor	hospital	admissions	for	and	mor-
talities	from	ILI	and	pneumonia.
In	addition	to	strengthening	surveillance	sys-
tems,	 the	 pandemic	 influenza	 response	 plan	
includes	strategies	to	contain	the	H5N1	virus	by	
establishing	quarantines;	restricting	movement;	
and	introducing	border	control	measures	such	as	
entry	and	exit	health	screening,	health	alert	notices,	
and	the	issuance	of	health	declaration	cards.	In	col-
laboration	with	the	Korea	Medical	Association	and	
the	Korea	Hospital	Association,	the	government	
plans	to	designate	treatment	hospitals,	develop	hos-
pital	preparedness	and	response	plans,	and	train	
medical	and	laboratory	personnel,	healthcare	work-
ers	in	clinics	and	quarantine	stations,	and	other	
first	responders	in	charge	of	patient	triage,	patient	
care,	and	infection	control.
The	pandemic	influenza	response	plan	also	iden-
tifies	three	tools	to	prevent,	contain,	and	manage	
an	avian	and	human	influenza	pandemic:	antiviral	
agent	acquisition,	influenza	vaccine	development,	
and	public	health	intervention.	South	Korea	has	
established	a	national	pandemic	stockpile	of	antivi-
ral	medications,	and	the	government	has	budgeted	
$13	million	through	2007	to	secure	additional	doses	
since	the	current	amount	in	circulation	is	less	than	
several	thousand	and	the	country	lacks	the	capaci-
ty	to	produce	antiviral	agents	domestically.	To	date,	
Korea	has	stockpiled	roughly	one	million	doses	of	
Tamiflu®	and	plans	to	stockpile	enough	to	treat	
20	percent	of	its	population,	or	roughly	ten	mil-
lion	doses,	which	some	experts	argue	is	too	low.	
In	late	2005,	Roche	agreed	to	sublicense	Tamiflu®	
to	Korea,	and	eleven	pharmaceutical	companies	
expressed	interest	in	producing	a	generic	version	of	
the	drug	jointly	with	Roche.	In	April	2006,	Roche	
agreed	to	license	the	drug	to	the	South	Korean	drug	
maker	Yuhan	Corporation.	It	is	unclear	if	Roche	
continues	to	negotiate	with	other	local	pharma-
ceutical	companies.
With	regard	to	the	development	of	pandem-
ic	influenza	vaccines,	South	Korea	plans	to	build	
domestic	capacity	for	vaccine	production,	stockpile	
pre-pandemic	vaccines,	and	increase	the	seasonal	
influenza	vaccination	rate,	which	already	targets	
over	30	percent	of	the	population.	The	domestic	
vaccine	production	capabilities	are	limited	and	no	
pre-vaccines	are	currently	available	in	South	Korea.	
Recently,	the	Ministry	of	Commerce,	Industry,	and	
Energy	has	authorized	the	Green	Cross	Corpora-
tion	to	build	a	facility	for	vaccine	production	by	
2009.	Moreover,	the	Korea	National	Institute	of	
Health	(KNIH),	the	National	Veterinary	and	Quar-
antine	Service	(NVRQS),	the	Ministry	of	Science	
and	Technology,	and	several	private	vaccine	com-
panies	are	conducting	research	projects	on	vaccine	
development.	
The	government	plans	to	develop	guidelines	and	
education	material	to	promote	public	health	mea-
sures	to	help	reduce	the	potential	burden	on	the	
medical	system.	In	2005,	the	Korea	Medical	Asso-
ciation	began	an	ongoing	education	campaign	to	
encourage	respiratory	etiquette,	hand	washing,	and	
good	hygiene.	In	the	event	of	an	influenza	pandem-
ic,	the	government	also	plans	to	introduce	social	
distancing	measures	such	as	quarantines	and	school	
closings,	restrict	movement	and	mass	gatherings,	
and	distribute	personal	protective	equipment.	To	
date,	South	Korea	has	stockpiled	300,000	sets	of	
personal	protective	equipment	for	use	at	the	cen-
tral	level	and	an	additional	110,000	N95	masks	
for	use	at	the	provincial	level.5	Unfortunately,	no	
15	 	A	N95	mask	is	a	disposable	mask	made	of	cloth	that	
blocks	95%	of	particles	that	are	0.3	microns	in	size	or	
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sound	evidence	exists	to	suggest	that	the	masks	
will	provide	any	protection	during	a	pandemic.	
Nevertheless,	the	government	plans	to	stockpile	
additional	sets	of	personal	protective	equipment	
and	masks.	
Finally,	the	national	influenza	response	plan	
also	urges	government	agencies	to	test	response	
measures	with	annual	simulations	and	tabletop	
exercises,	as	well	as	conduct	research	projects	on	
the	economic	and	disease	burden,	risk	communi-
cation,	the	effectiveness	of	public	health	measures	
and	medical	services,	the	psychosocial	aspects	of	
a	crisis	and	its	aftermath,	and	the	legal	and	ethi-
cal	issues	of	pandemic	influenza.	
As	a	member	of	the	WHO	Global	Influenza	Sur-
veillance	Network	and	a	designated	WHO	National	
Influenza	Center,	the	KCDC	conducts	research	
and	monitors	influenza	activity	in	South	Korea.	It	
also	launched	a	website,	http://avian.cdc.go.kr	(not	
available	in	English),	to	help	raise	public	aware-
ness	and	disseminate	pertinent	information	about	
the	H5N1	virus.	Since	2004,	the	KCDC	has	host-
ed	several	tabletop	exercises	to	test	the	national	
pandemic	preparedness	and	response	plan,	identi-
fy	weaknesses,	and	revise	the	plan	accordingly.	In	
fact,	South	Korea	is	one	of	the	few	governments	
in	the	western	Pacific	region	that	has	run	such	
elaborate	simulations	for	central	and	local	gov-
ernment	agencies	and	international	experts.	In	
December	2004,	the	KCDC	conducted	its	first	
tabletop	exercise	in	crisis	management	for	emerg-
ing	infectious	diseases.	A	second	tabletop	exercise	
to	test	the	existing	standard	operating	procedures	
in	response	to	an	emerging	infectious	disease	was	
conducted	in	March	2005.	Over	150	participants	
from	various	government	agencies,	including	the	
Ministries	of	National	Defense,	Agriculture	and	
Forestry,	and	Health	and	Welfare;	national	intel-
ligence;	police;	emergency	management;	and	the	
armed	forces	medical	command	were	involved	in	
the	March	simulation.	Representatives	from	six-
teen	cities	and	provinces,	medical	institutions,	and	
civil	groups	were	present.	Observers	included	pol-
icy	and	military	game	experts,	officials	from	the	
MHLW	of	Japan,	and	WHO	representatives.	The	
simulation	exercise	identified	major	obstacles	to	
prevention	and	containment,	such	as	the	lack	of	
public	health	workers	for	infection	control,	low	sup-
ply	of	protective	medical	equipment	and	antiviral	
medications,	and	inadequate	methods	of	distribut-
ing	central	stockpiles.	
Lessons	 learned	 from	 the	 tabletop	 exercise	
were	shared	with	other	APEC	leaders	at	the	APEC	
Emerging	Infectious	Network	(EINet)	virtual	sym-
posium	on	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	and	
response	in	January	2006,	as	well	as	with	the	WHO	
at	another	international	meeting.	Since	the	simu-
lation,	the	government	has	implemented	some	of	
the	lessons	learned,	including	measures	to	promote	
interagency	collaboration	and	cooperation,	opti-
mize	decision-making	channels,	reinforce	relevant	
laws	such	as	the	Communicable	Disease	Preven-
tion	Act,	and	establish	critical	infrastructure	such	
as	rapid	response	teams,	adequate	medical	resourc-
es,	and	an	increased	number	of	isolation	facilities.	
The	government	plans	to	invest	$20	million	to	
increase	the	total	number	of	isolation	facilities	at	
treatment	hospitals	from	519	to	roughly	1,000	by	
2009.	Moreover,	the	KCDC	has	established	sever-
al	rapid	response	teams	and	a	public	health	crisis	
response	and	exercise	team.
On	October	11-13,	2006,	the	KCDC	hosted	
a	follow-up	simulation	exercise	and	international	
workshop,	Crisis	Response	Exercise	for	Pandem-
ic	Influenza,	to	test	the	crisis	management	and	
decision-making	process	in	the	event	of	an	avian	
influenza	outbreak.	Organizers	prepared	exercise	
manuals	for	the	response	teams,	control	teams,	
and	virus	teams.	The	overarching	goal	of	the	exer-
cise	was	to	test	several	policy	issues	that	address	
when	and	how	to	distribute	reserved	resources	and	
antiviral	drugs,	secure	hospital	beds	and	medical	
practitioners,	limit	social	gatherings	and	restrict	
movement,	conduct	risk	communication	with	mass	
media	and	the	general	population,	communicate	
effectively	between	central	and	local	respondents,	
and	apply	current	response	manuals.	The	table-
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over	three	hundred	delegates	from	the	Ministry	of	
Health	and	Welfare,	KCDC,	public	health	centers	
and	related	institutions,	and	sixteen	metropolitan	
areas	and	provinces	in	South	Korea.	Also	present	
were	over	fifty	observers	and	international	experts	
from	the	WHO,	UN,	World	Bank,	RAND,	the	pri-
vate	sector,	the	United	States,	Germany,	Japan,	
China,	Indonesia,	Singapore,	Germany,	and	other	
APEC	economies.	
16	 	Additional	information	on	past	pandemic	influenza	
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Major	disaster	relief	operations,	such	as	the	responses	to	the	December	
2004	tsunami	and	the	October	2005	earthquake	in	Pakistan,	demon-
strated	the	prowess	of	the	military	to	respond	to	natural	disasters	and	
calls	for	humanitarian	assistance.	Despite	the	well-executed	military	
response,	however,	significant	organizational	and	operational	chal-
lenges	complicated	response	efforts,	such	as	the	political	constraints	
on	the	use	of	military	assets,	divergent	operational	cultures,	and	insuf-
ficient	civil-military	and	military-to-military	coordination.	Growing	
interest	in	and	support	for	disaster	relief	missions	have	impelled	gov-
ernment	officials	and	military	planners	to	improve	response	planning	
and	coordination	in	disaster	response	and	crisis	management	activities,	
especially	given	the	emerging	threat	of	an	influenza	pandemic.
Since	the	majority	of	avian	and	human	infections	of	the	H5N1	virus	
to	date	are	within	the	Asia	theater,	experts	believe	a	pandemic	is	immi-
nent	and	that	it	will	originate	in	the	Pacific	region.	Military	planners	
in	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	have	taken	
steps	accordingly	to	formalize	military	response	plans,	leverage	existing	
partnerships,	enhance	interoperability,	and	integrate	planning	efforts	
in	support	of	civilian	agencies	and	other	first	responders	with	initial	
response	efforts.
A	coordinated,	collaborative	response	effort,	however,	necessitates	
an	open	dialogue	among	military	planners	in	order	to	minimize	the	
potential	health	and	economic	impact,	including	related	security	chal-
lenges	and	social	implications,	of	a	pandemic	influenza	contingency,	
and	by	extension,	other	natural	disaster,	pandemic	disease,	or	biohaz-
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ard	events.	One	workshop	participant	noted,	“As	
military	planners,	we	need	to	get	into	the	details.	
We	need	to	exchange	plans	to	understand	what	our	
partners	can	and	cannot	do	in	response	to	a	crisis.	
We	may	choose	to	react	differently	to	a	crisis,	but	
we	must	aim	for	interoperability	if	not	integration,	
because	no	one	group	has	the	answers	or	resourc-
es	to	manage	a	disaster	alone.	We	can’t	organize	
once	a	crisis	has	occurred;	we	need	to	iron	out	the	
details	now	that	we	have	time	on	our	side.”	
United States
Although	not	designated	as	a	lead	agency	in	the	
national	response	to	avian	influenza,	the	Depart-
ment	of	Defense	(DoD)	is	intimately	involved	in	
assisting	civil	authorities,	international	partners,	
and	foreign	governments	with	global	surveillance	
and	emergency	preparedness.	For	example,	the	
DoD	 Global	 Emerging	 Infections	 Surveillance	
and	Response	System	(DoD-GEIS)	supports	mili-
tary	training,	public	health	research,	and	outbreak	
response	to	emerging	infectious	disease	threats.	
DoD-GEIS	has	a	rich	network	of	overseas	medi-
cal	research	laboratories	and	treatment	facilities	
that	detect,	research,	and	treat	infectious	diseas-
es,	as	well	as	monitor	incidents	of	influenza	among	
military	populations.	Moreover,	DoD-GEIS	shares	
epidemiological	data,	laboratory	samples,	and	sur-
veillance	reports	with	the	CDC,	WHO,	and	other	
international	 partners.	 In	 addition	 to	 influen-
za	surveillance	activities,	DoD-GEIS	has	assisted	
affected	and	at-risk	countries	with	pandemic	pre-
paredness	and	response	plans,	provided	diagnostic	
support,	and	trained	healthcare	workers	and	other	
first	responders.	DoD	also	plans	to	create	U.S.	
rapid	response	teams	and	to	develop	joint	mili-
tary	training	and	exercises	with	other	countries	
for	pandemic	influenza	preparedness	and	response.	
In	2006,	DoD	received	$130	million	in	emergency	
supplemental	appropriations	for	avian	flu	activities;	
however,	the	fiscal	year	2007	budget	request	did	
not	include	funding	for	avian	flu	programs	(Con-
gressional	Research	Service	2006,	13).
Despite	 the	 military’s	 commitment	 to	 pro-
vide	domestic	and	international	support	to	civil	
authorities,	international	partners,	and	foreign	gov-
ernments,	DoD’s	top	priority	in	the	fight	against	
avian	influenza	is	safeguarding	U.S.	defensive	
capabilities,	specifically	maintaining	force	health	
protection	and	operational	readiness.	To	this	end,	
DoD	has	developed	educational	tools,	published	
travel	advisories,	standardized	laboratory	data	
management	at	military	hospitals,	improved	inter-
agency	communication	networks,	and	launched	a	
pandemic	flu	website	(http://www.deploymentlink.
osd.mil)	to	keep	service	members,	civilian	work-
ers,	and	family	members	abreast	of	avian	influenza	
outbreaks,	medical	research,	and	in-theater	surveil-
lance.	Moreover,	DoD	and	each	of	the	combatant	
commands	are	developing	their	own	prepared-
ness	and	response	plans	for	pandemic	influenza	
in	addition	to	observing	the	guidelines	and	recom-
mendations	outlined	in	the	National	Strategy	for	
Pandemic	Influenza	and	Implementation	Plan	for	
the	National	Strategy	for	Pandemic	Influenza.	In	
November	2005,	the	chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	
of	Staff	(CJCS)	issued	guidance	on	the	implementa-
tion	of	policies	to	prepare	for,	prevent,	and	contain	
the	effects	of	avian	influenza	on	the	military	forces	
and	wider	defense	community.	The	Department	of	
Defense	also	released	its	pandemic	influenza	imple-
mentation	plan	in	August	2006,	but	the	document	
remains	classified.	
Of	all	the	major	combatant	commands,	U.S.	
Pacific	Command	(PACOM)	has	been	in	the	fore-
front	in	planning	for	a	potential	pandemic,	largely	
because	the	majority	of	animal	and	human	avian	
influenza	outbreaks	to	date	have	occurred	in	the	
Pacific	theater	and	therefore	within	PACOM’s	
area	of	responsibility.	In	addition	to	preparing	a	
PACOM	plan	for	pandemic	influenza,	support-
ing	preparedness	plans	for	foreign	and	domestic	
response	also	are	being	developed	by	the	Com-
bined	Support	Force-503	(CSF-503	Marine	Forces	
Pacific),	the	Joint	Task	Force-Homeland	Defense	
(JTF-HD),	the	service	components,	the	subordinate	
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kan	Command,	and	Special	Operations	Command	
Pacific,	and	each	respective	base	command.	
A	focus	of	PACOM	influenza	pandem-
ic	preparedness	plans	is	force	health	protection	
and	operation	readiness.	In	addition	to	enhanc-
ing	DoD	activities	in	education,	surveillance,	and	
laboratory	data	management,	PACOM	has	man-
dated	routine	influenza	vaccinations,	developed	
quarantine	and	isolation	measures,	obtained	a	lim-
ited	quantity	of	the	H5N1	pre-vaccine,	established	
stockpiles	of	antiviral	medications	and	personal	
protective	equipment,	and	directed	medical	treat-
ment	facilities	under	PACOM	control	to	develop	
expansion	plans	and	identify	the	key	equipment	
needed	for	surge	capacity.	For	example,	PACOM	
plans	to	stockpile	six	million	treatment	courses	of	
Tamiflu®	and	expand	both	the	number	of	hospital	
beds	at	military	bases	in	the	Pacific,	from	588	to	
over	1,300,	and	aboard	hospital	ships,	from	1,000	
to	6,000	(Moszkowicz	2005).	
With	regard	to	evacuating	U.S.	citizens	
to	safe	havens,	PACOM	may	conduct	noncomba-
tant	evacuation	operations	during	a	pandemic	if	
directed.	However,	military	planners	are	uncer-
tain	whether	the	best	means	to	contain	the	spread	
of	the	disease	is	to	shelter	individuals	in	place	or	
evacuate	them	prior	to	exposure.	Some	workshop	
participants	feared	that	noncombatant	evacua-
tion	operations	would	increase	the	risk	of	disease	
transmission	to	surrounding	areas,	especially	if	
U.S.	military	forces	required	the	use	of	foreign	
runways	and	seaports	en	route	to	United	States	ter-
ritory.	When	one	official	from	Japan	asked	whether	
PACOM	plans	to	evacuate	noncombatants	from	
South	Korea	to	the	United	States	through	Japan,	
for	example,	U.S.	officials	did	not	have	a	direct	
answer,	but	did	stress	that	the	U.S.	military	would	
not	undertake	such	missions	without	the	consent	
of	the	host	nation.	One	PACOM	official	added,	
“This	issue	continues	to	come	up	and	needs	to	be	
determined,	because	noncombatant	evacuation	
operations	are	a	real	possibility.”	The	exchange	
among	workshop	participants	on	the	issue	of	non-
combatant	evacuation	operations	offered	a	glimpse	
as	to	the	number	of	outstanding	political	issues	
that	need	to	be	addressed	now	to	avoid	difficult	
and	tense	exchanges	between	governments	and	
militaries	during	a	pandemic.
Although	maintaining	force	health	pro-
tection	and	operational	readiness	remains	the	
top	priority,	PACOM	also	plans	to	respond	to	U.S.	
government	and	host	nation	requests	for	medi-
cal,	logistic,	engineering,	and	security	support.	
To	date,	PACOM	has	conducted	several	deliber-
ate	planning-and-exercise	programs	in	support	of	
civil	authorities	in	Asia,	including	tabletop	exer-
cise	and	regional	capacity-building	programs,	such	
as	developing	medical	surveillance	and	laborato-
ry	assistance	programs.	In	October	2005,	PACOM	
sponsored	an	influenza	seminar	in	Pearl	Harbor	
to	educate	and	inform	public	health	emergency	
officers	from	across	the	Pacific	about	the	risks	
and	challenges	of	avian	influenza,	as	well	as	the	
potential	effects	of	the	virus	on	military	operations	
and	deployments.	PACOM	also	hosted	a	tabletop	
exercise	to	test	military	readiness	and	response	
in	November	2005.	The	exercise	included	over	
125	military	and	civilian	participants	from	U.S.	
Forces	Japan,	U.S.	Forces	Korea,	the	Office	of	the	
Secretary	of	Defense	Health	Affairs,	U.S.	Central	
Command,	and	nongovernmental	organizations.	
One	of	the	lessons	learned	from	the	exercise	was	
that	the	military	tends	to	over-classify	information	
and	use	military	jargon,	which	limited	communi-
cation	between	participants	and	delayed	effective	
response	activities.	In	June	2006,	roughly	60	select	
individuals	from	PACOM,	U.S.	Marine	Corps	Forc-
es	Pacific,	and	other	U.S.	government	agencies,	
including	medical	professionals,	operational	plan-
ners,	and	communication	and	technical	experts,	
conducted	a	three-day	tabletop	exercise	at	the	Asia-
Pacific	Center	for	Security	Studies	in	Hawaii	to	
explore	means	for	enhancing	interagency	coordi-
nation	in	preparation	for	a	pandemic	outbreak	of	
H5N1.	
	To	avoid	poor	risk	communication	in	the	event	
of	an	outbreak,	PACOM	has	proposed	to	host	a	
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manage	communications	and	information	sharing	
among	the	governments,	militaries,	international	
organizations,	and	U.S.	interagency	representatives	
in	the	forty-three	nations	within	PACOM’s	the-
ater.	One	workshop	participant	wondered	whether	
PACOM	could	perhaps	establish	a	new	coordination	
crisis	center	or	simply	imitate	the	model	erected	
during	the	2004	tsunami	disaster	relief	operation	
in	which	military	personnel,	government	officials,	
NGO	representatives,	and	UN	agencies,	(such	as	
the	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	Humanitarian	
Affairs	(OCHA),	World	Food	Programme	(WFP),	
and	WHO),	interfaced	daily	through	the	Com-
bined	Coordination	Center.	However,	unlike	the	
2004	tsunami,	which	was	a	sudden	and	unexpect-
ed	event	that	demanded	an	immediate	multilateral	
response,	an	influenza	pandemic	will	occur	com-
munity	by	community,	and	therefore,	necessitates	
(and	allows)	preparedness,	coordination,	and	com-
munication	at	the	local	level.	“We	are	in	a	pre-crisis	
stage	and	should	focus	on	providing	explicit	guid-
ance	to	ensure	local	preparedness.	How	a	nation	
or	the	international	community	will	coordinate	
and	respond	to	a	pandemic	depends	on	what	is	
happening	in	each	community,	which	includes	mil-
itary	installations.	The	effectiveness	of	a	regional	
coordination	center	will	depend	on	the	local	com-
munication	networks	on	the	ground,”	argued	one	
workshop	participant	in	favor	of	strengthening	local	
risk	communications	versus	promoting	a	PACOM-
led	or	tsunami-like	coordination	center.
Japan
Unlike	the	United	States	Department	of	Defense,	
the	Japan	Defense	Agency	(JDA)	has	not	prepared	
a	pandemic	influenza	response	plan	to	supplement	
the	Pandemic	Influenza	Preparedness	Action	Plan	
of	the	Japanese	Government.	Instead,	the	JDA	relies	
on	existing	protocols	for	crisis	management	and	
disaster	relief	response.	In	response	to	an	avian	
flu	incident	and	only	at	the	request	of	local	govern-
ment	officials,	the	JDA	will	authorize	the	nation’s	
Self	Defense	Forces	(SDF)	to	provide	support	ser-
vices	to	local	officials	in	the	form	of	Disaster	Relief	
Operations	or	Epidemic	Prevention	Operations	
by	Entrustment.	The	type	of	operation	initiated	
depends	on	the	severity	of	the	event	and	the	risk	
to	human	life	and	property.	For	a	severe	event,	nat-
ural	calamity	or	other	disaster,	the	SDF	responds	
in	the	form	of	a	disaster	relief	operation,	whereas	
if	the	event	is	minor,	less	severe,	or	easy	to	contain	
the	SDF	works	under	the	framework	of	an	epidemic	
prevention	operation.	In	either	case,	the	local	gov-
ernment	oversees	and	manages	the	work	of	the	SDF,	
as	well	as	provides	the	SDF	with	the	appropriate	
personal	protective	equipment	and	clothing.
As	of	December	2006,	the	SDF	had	conducted	
two	operations	in	response	to	avian	flu	outbreaks	
at	commercial	poultry	farms.	In	both	cases,	experts	
believe	infected	wild	birds	contaminated	the	cage	
surfaces	of	the	commercial	flocks.	In	late	Febru-
ary	2004,	officials	at	the	Asada	Farm	in	the	Kyoto	
prefecture	reported	the	mass	death	of	poultry	due	
to	an	outbreak	of	a	highly	pathogenic	strain	of	the	
H5N1	virus.	Soon,	similar	cases	of	H5N1	and	ani-
mal	deaths	were	reported	in	neighboring	poultry	
farms	(Takada,	Murata,	Mizuho,	YM,	Nakatan,	and	
Yamamoto	Sangyo).	At	the	request	of	the	prefec-
tural	governor,	the	SDF	responded	to	each	avian	
flu	incident.	At	the	Murata,	Mizuho,	YM,	Naka-
tan,	and	Yamamoto	Sangyo	poultry	farms,	the	SDF	
worked	under	the	framework	of	an	epidemic	pre-
vention	operation	and	disinfected	the	birdcages,	
vehicles,	and	other	facilities	on	the	poultry	farms.	
At	the	Asada	and	Takada	poultry	farms,	the	SDF	
worked	under	the	framework	of	a	disaster	relief	
operation,	which	in	addition	to	decontaminating	
the	poultry	farms	required	the	SDF	to	dispose	and	
bury	the	infected	birds	nearby	in	ditches	lined	with	
resin	sheets	and	covered	with	top	soil	and	plastic	to	
limit	the	risk	of	pollution.	In	addition	to	disinfect-
ing	and	depopulating	the	poultry	farms,	movement	
controls	were	strictly	enforced	and	not	lifted	until	
mid	April.	The	Takada	farm	began	operations	in	
August	2004,	but	the	Asada	farm	remains	closed	
even	though	the	area	is	disease	free.	In	total,	the	
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disposed	of	240,000	birds	in	the	Kyoto	prefecture.	
To	prevent	infection,	Tamiflu®	was	distributed	to	
SDF	personnel	involved	in	the	mission.
In	September	2005,	two	poultry	farms	in	the	
Ibaraki	municipality	reported	cases	of	a	mild	patho-
genic	form	of	avian	influenza.	For	the	most	part,	
local	government	officials	handled	the	matter	
themselves,	but	invited	the	SDF	to	assist.	Work-
ing	again	under	the	framework	of	a	disaster	relief	
operation,	the	SDF	dispatched	two	thousand	per-
sonnel,	disinfected	both	poultry	farms	and	facilities,	
and	disposed	of	approximately	440,000	infected	
birds.	In	total,	local	government	authorities	culled	
roughly	6,000,000	birds	in	the	immediate	and	
surrounding	areas.	SDF	personnel	also	received	
courses	of	Tamiflu®,	but	treatments	ended	once	
authorities	realized	the	viral	strain	was	not	H5N1	
but	H5N2,	a	much	less	virulent	form	of	avian	influ-
enza	with	no	known	human	infections.
Overall,	Japan’s	strategy	for	managing	and	
containing	 outbreaks	 of	 avian	 influenza	 is	 to	
strengthen	the	local	capacity	to	respond	to	the	
incident	and	dispatch	the	SDF	for	support	when	
requested	by	the	prefectural	governors.	However,	
JDA	representatives	present	at	the	workshop	noted	
that	although	the	SDF	successfully	completed	both	
missions,	there	were	significant	challenges	in	coor-
dinating	a	response	with	local	government	officials.	
As	a	result,	the	JDA	plans	to	improve	local	com-
munication	networks	and	train	SDF	personnel	for	
future	missions.	
Republic of Korea
The	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 has	 adopted	 a	 slightly	
different	approach	to	military	planning	and	pre-
paredness	for	pandemic	influenza	than	the	United	
States	or	Japan.	The	Armed	Forces	Medical	Com-
mand	(AFMC)	has	developed	a	surveillance	system	
to	monitor	emerging	infectious	diseases	and	detect	
incidents	of	avian	influenza	and	biohazard	threats.	
The	AFMC’s	surveillance	system	consists	of	three	
different	structures	to	screen	for	influenza	and	
other	infectious	diseases	among	military	person-
nel:	the	Notifiable	Infectious	Disease	Reporting	
System,	the	Pneumonia	Surveillance	System,	and	
the	Emergency	Room	Surveillance	System.
The	Notifiable	Infectious	Disease	Reporting	
System	monitors	various	infectious	diseases	des-
ignated	by	the	infectious	disease	prevention	law,	
such	as	typhoid	fever,	malaria,	tuberculosis,	yellow	
fever,	and	other	newly	reported	infectious	diseas-
es,	in	order	to	contain	the	spread	of	the	disease	
through	early	recognition,	patient	isolation,	and	
reinforcement	of	preventive	measures.	The	infec-
tious	disease	prevention	law	classifies	the	various	
infectious	diseases	into	five	categories	based	on	the	
severity	of	the	disease,	the	availability	of	vaccines,	
and	the	requirements	for	notification,	surveillance,	
and	monitoring.	Pandemic	influenza	is	included	
in	group	4,	along	with	yellow	fever,	dengue	fever,	
smallpox,	and	botulism,	and	requires	immediate	
notification	once	detected.	About	twenty	military	
hospitals	and	institutions	report	infectious	disease	
cases	to	the	AFMC	through	this	system	in	addition	
to	providing	secondary	medical	care	to	patients	
transferred	from	medical	battalions	and	field	hos-
pitals.	The	AFMC	then	issues	weekly	status	reports	
and	analyses	on	the	diseases	reported	by	the	net-
work	hospitals.
In	2004,	the	AFMC	introduced	the	Pneumo-
nia	Surveillance	System	to	closely	monitor	febrile	
and	pneumonia	patients	admitted	to	the	military	
hospitals	in	order	to	detect	emerging	infectious	
diseases.	The	system	was	reinforced	recently,	after	
outbreaks	of	avian	influenza	at	home	and	in	neigh-
boring	countries.	Again,	the	AFMC	issues	weekly	
status	reports	on	the	number	of	admissions	and	
patient	symptoms.	
The	most	innovative	and	advanced	of	the	three	
surveillance	systems	is	the	Emergency	Room	Sur-
veillance	System,	which	detects	certain	infectious	
diseases	by	monitoring	the	symptoms	and	clini-
cal	conditions	of	patients	visiting	emergency	care	
centers	at	the	military	hospitals.	The	twenty	par-
ticipating	hospitals	report	daily	to	the	AFMC	on	
the	number	of	patients	and	the	clinical	condi-
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be	made.	To	detect	either	an	emerging	infectious	
disease,	such	as	SARS,	food-borne	infection,	or	pan-
demic	influenza,	or	the	presence	of	an	infectious	
disease	used	as	a	biological	terror	weapon,	such	as	
smallpox,	anthrax,	or	plague,	the	Emergency	Room	
Surveillance	System	monitors	and	reports	on	five	
syndromes	(acute	rash	syndrome,	acute	neurologic	
syndrome,	hemorrhagic	syndrome,	acute	respirato-
ry	syndrome,	and	acute	diarrhea	syndrome).	With	
regard	to	suspected	influenza	cases,	the	military	
hospitals	use	rapid	influenza	diagnosis	kits	for	daily	
testing	of	20	percent	of	patients	suffering	from	
upper	respiratory	illnesses.
With	regard	to	crisis	management,	the	National	
Security	Council	developed	the	National	Disaster	
Management	Guideline	on	Infectious	Diseases,	
which	outlined	the	national	crisis	management	
and	response	system	for	infectious	disease,	as	well	
as	tasked	each	government	agency,	including	the	
Ministry	of	National	Defense	(MND),	to	develop	
its	own	disaster	field	response	manual.	In	Novem-
ber	2005,	the	MND	released	its	infectious	disease	
field	response	manual.	
In	response	to	a	pandemic	influenza	outbreak	
(pandemic	alert	phases	4-6	or	during	any	other	nat-
ural	disaster	or	biohazard	event),	the	MND	would	
stand	up	a	disaster	response	center	and	a	central	
military	infectious	disease	control	center,	headed	
by	a	disaster	management	and	health	policy	team,	
respectively.	Each	service	component	(army,	navy,	
air	force)	also	would	set	up	a	disaster	response	center	
and	infectious	disease	control	center	and	report	to	
the	MND.	In	addition,	the	AFMC	would	assemble	
a	military	hospital	infectious	disease	control	team,	
and	the	Armed	Forces	Medical	Research	Institute	
(AFMRI)	would	run	a	laboratory-based	surveillance	
center.	Both	the	AFMC	and	the	AFMRI	would	
report	to	the	MND	health	policy	team.	The	MND	
requires	the	AFMC	and	each	of	the	service	compo-
nents	to	cooperate,	share	information,	and	commu-
nicate	results	and	status	reports	immediately	with	
each	other	and	with	the	MND.	Finally,	the	MND	
would	work	intimately	and	in	cooperation	with	the	
National	Security	Council,	the	MOHW,	and	other	
government	agencies	throughout	each	stage	of	the	
pandemic	influenza	attack.	
The	military	response	system	for	pandemic	
influenza	also	reclassified	the	WHO	pandemic	alert	
phases	as	observation	(code	blue),	caution	(code	yel-
low),	alert	(code	orange),	and	critical	(code	red).7	
For	each	stage,	the	MND	has	identified	key	mea-
sures	for	the	military	to	assume.	South	Korea	is	
currently	at	the	observation	stage,	and	the	mili-
tary	is	reinforcing	its	three	surveillance	systems,	
determining	the	medical	capacity	of	the	military	
hospitals	to	treat	infected	patients,	and	providing	
educational	tools	and	training	programs	to	medi-
cal	personnel	and	service	members.	At	the	caution	
stage,	the	military	would	form	a	central	epidem-
ic	investigation	unit	and	advisory	board,	develop	
emergency	disinfection	systems,	establish	an	early	
evacuation	system	to	move	suspected	patients	to	
military	hospitals,	and	introduce	isolation	and	quar-
antine	measures.	At	the	alert	stage	the	military	
would	expand	the	availability	of	disinfection	equip-
ment	and	materials,	activate	the	disaster	response	
center,	and	launch	a	twenty-four-hour	emergency	
disinfection	system.	Finally,	at	the	critical	stage,	
the	military	would	establish	an	emergency	disinfec-
tion	operation	at	each	military	hospital,	reinforce	
cooperative	networks	with	the	NSC,	MOHW,	and	
other	government	agencies,	and	execute	measures	
to	maintain	social	order	and	prevent	panic	among	
the	general	population	and	military.
South	Korea	continues	to	prepare	for	an	avian	
influenza	pandemic.	In	October	2006,	the	military	
participated	in	a	tabletop	exercise	sponsored	by	the	
KCDC.	The	military	also	plans	to	schedule	future	
crisis	management	exercises.	Moreover,	in	order	to	
17	 	The	observation	stage	is	equivalent	to	WHO	phases	1-3	
if	no	human	infections	have	occurred	in	South	Korea;	
otherwise,	it	is	equivalent	to	WHO	phases	1-2.	The	cau-
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is	equivalent	to	WHO	phase	3.	The	alert	stage	is	equiv-
alent	to	WHO	phase	6	if	no	human	infections	have	
occurred	in	South	Korea;	otherwise,	it	is	equivalent	
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protect	military	personnel	against	avian	influenza,	
the	MND	has	for	the	past	two	years	been	run-
ning	seasonal	influenza	vaccination	programs	for	
military	recruits	and	medical	personnel.	To	date,	
eight	thousand	service	members	have	participated	
in	this	program	and	the	MND	plans	to	expand	the	
number	of	military	participants.	Moreover,	the	mil-
itary	plans	to	stockpile	enough	Tamiflu®	(250,000	
capsules)	to	treat	thirty	thousand	military	person-
nel	by	the	end	of	2007;	Plans	are	also	in	place	to	
prepare	guidelines	on	the	distribution	of	antivi-
ral	agents	to	military	and	medical	personnel	given	
the	limited	supply	of	Tamiflu®.	In	2005,	the	mil-
itary	also	issued	thirty	thousand	sets	of	personal	
protective	sets	to	the	military	hospitals,	includ-
ing	respiratory	protectors	and	protective	suits	and	
gloves.	Finally,	in	cooperation	with	the	KCDC,	the	
military	plans	to	increase	the	number	of	isolation	
wards	and	treatment	facilities	at	military	hospitals	
in	order	to	quarantine	pandemic	influenza	patients.	
In	the	meantime,	these	facilities	will	be	used	to	iso-
late	respiratory	infectious	disease	patients.	To	date,	
one	hospital	has	fifty	medical	isolation	beds,	and	
the	military	hopes	to	add	an	additional	fifty	such	
beds	at	each	military	hospital	per	year	through	
2009.
The	ROK	military	has	conducted	several	crisis	
management	operations.	During	the	SARS	outbreak	
in	2003,	the	military	sent	176	military	medical	per-
sonnel	to	quarantine	suspected	individuals	and	to	
screen	passengers	at	Incheon	International	Air-
port,	Kimhae	Airport,	and	at	quarantine	stations	
in	Incheon	and	Pusan	for	a	period	of	sixty-seven	
days.	The	military	also	installed	infrared	monitor-
ing	cameras	at	the	airports	to	detect	fevers.	Over	
475,000	people	were	quarantined	during	that	time	
even	though	there	were	no	human	cases	of	SARS	
in	South	Korea.	
From	December	2003	to	March	2004,	about	392	
poultry	farms	from	ten	different	regions	in	South	
Korea	reported	animal	cases	of	avian	influenza.	
The	military	sent	over	five	thousand	personnel	and	
163	sets	of	equipment	to	cull	and	dispose	of	over	
5.6	million	chickens	and	ducks	at	a	cost	of	$48	mil-
lion	(Yonhap	News	2006a).	There	were	no	reports	
of	any	human	infections	of	avian	influenza	dur-
ing	that	time.
Less	than	three	years	after	the	2004	outbreak,	
South	Korea	confirmed	the	presence	of	a	highly	
pathogenic	strain	of	H5N1	in	November	2006	after	
roughly	6,500	poultry	died	at	a	commercial	farm	
in	the	southern	city	of	Iksan,	an	area	located	in	the	
hub	of	the	poultry	industry.	Authorities	immediate-
ly	culled	more	than	236,000	chickens	and	ducks	at	
six	farms	within	a	five-hundred-meter	radius,	along	
with	300	pigs	and	577	dogs	within	the	area	(Yon-
hap	News	2006b).	Quarantine	officials,	backed	by	
police	and	soldiers,	also	cordoned	off	a	ten-kilo-
meter	radius	around	the	outbreak	site.	About	236	
soldiers	in	protective	gear	were	deployed	to	sev-
enteen	checkpoints	around	the	quarantine	area	
to	control	the	movement	of	people	and	vehicles.	
Soldiers	involved	in	the	operation	also	received	
vaccine	injections	and	Tamiflu®	(Agence	France-
Presse	2006).	On	December	1,	officials	confirmed	
additional	cases	of	H5N1	at	a	second	farm	within	a	
three-kilometer	radius	of	the	initial	outbreak	site.	
As	a	result,	over	180	government	officials	began	
culling	an	additional	600,000	chickens	on	over	
thirty-five	farms	in	an	attempt	to	stem	the	spread	
of	the	virus.	Moreover,	local	officials	have	stepped	
up	public	awareness	campaigns	to	assure	the	pub-
lic	that	it	is	safe	to	eat	well-cooked	chicken	meat.	
There	have	been	no	reports	of	infected	residents,	
poultry	workers,	or	quarantine	officials	to	date.	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge
The	extensive	geographical	spread	and	tenacious	morbidity	of	the	H5N1	virus	
in	the	past	three	years	have	increased	the	probability	that	a	pandemic	will	
occur.	As	of	December	2006,	the	H5N1	virus	had	infected	over	263	humans	
and	killed	158,	a	60	percent	mortality	rate.	Scientists	cannot	predict	wheth-
er	the	virus	will	retain	its	present	virulence	should	it	acquire	the	ability	to	
spread	easily	among	humans.	Nevertheless,	the	number	of	human	infections	
increased	in	2006	over	the	previous	three	years	despite	international	efforts	
to	contain	the	virus,	suggesting	H5N1	continues	to	circulate	among	wild	birds	
and	infect	humans.	Pandemics	are	unstoppable	once	the	international	spread	
of	an	airborne,	endemic	virus	emerges.	Experts	expect	that	the	next	pandem-
ic	will	reach	all	parts	of	the	world	within	three	months.	Experiences	during	
the	SARS	outbreak	in	2003	suggest	that	a	pandemic	will	cause	abrupt	surges	
in	people	seeking	medical	care,	temporarily	overwhelming	healthcare	servic-
es.	Moreover,	high	rates	of	work	absenteeism	will	disrupt	essential	services,	
such	as	law	enforcement,	transportation,	government	services,	and	economic	
productivity.	The	social	and	economic	impact	of	a	pandemic	will	be	ampli-
fied	given	today’s	interdependent	systems	of	trade	and	commerce,	potentially	
costing	the	world	economy	up	to	$2	trillion	in	losses.
The	only	reliable	defense	against	pandemic	influenza	is	the	improvement	
of	existing	structures	and	mechanisms	and	the	development	of	warning	and	
communication	systems,	rapid	containment	strategies,	and	preparedness	
plans.	The	national	pandemic	influenza	response	plans	and	military	strate-
gies	outlined	in	the	preceding	sections	demonstrate	the	different	approaches	
adopted	by	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	in	combating	
the	emerging	threat	of	a	pandemic	influenza.	Each	country	has	developed	
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plans	that	leverage	its	existing	capabilities,	technol-
ogy,	and	networks.	For	example,	the	United	States	
has	poured	a	significant	amount	of	resources	into	
vaccine	research	and	development,	whereas	Japan	
has	directed	aid	to	improve	regional	networks	to	
detect	and	respond	to	avian	flu	incidents,	and	the	
Republic	of	Korea	has	expended	capital	to	improve	
domestic	surveillance	systems	and	conduct	multi-
lateral	tabletop	exercises.	Although	policy	planners	
have	made	significant	progress	in	preparing	for	a	
pandemic	influenza	crisis,	challenges	remain	with	
regard	to	coordinating	and	integrating	planning	
efforts,	leveraging	existing	partnerships,	enhancing	
interoperability,	combining	resources,	and	iden-
tifying	areas	for	enhanced	cooperation	within	a	
multilateral	context.
On	the	surface,	pandemic	influenza	planning	
appears	high	on	the	agenda,	but	except	for	a	hand-
ful	of	countries,	pandemic	influenza	planning	
overall	has	not	been	a	top	priority	or	concern	to	
wider	government	or	military	circles	given	their	
existing	health	and	security	challenges.	Moreover,	
the	private	sector,	local	communities,	and	health-
care	facilities	have	paid	little	attention	to	the	issue	
despite	efforts	to	encourage	continuity	planning.	
Public	awareness	also	remains	low	in	most	corners	
of	the	world	in	spite	of	the	numerous	educational	
campaigns	initiated	by	the	WHO	and	other	region-
al	and	multilateral	partners.	Finally,	although	
the	WHO	is	designated	to	lead	the	international	
response	to	an	influenza	pandemic,	the	organiza-
tion	is	severely	under	funded	and	under	staffed	to	
act	alone.	As	such,	the	organization	relies	on	lead-
ing	regional	actors	to	coordinate	response	measures,	
including	in	countries	outside	areas	of	nation-
al	interest,	such	as	in	remote	dwellings	in	Africa.	
Moreover,	since	the	WHO	will	depend	on	nation-
al	governments	to	assist	with	rapid	containment	
measures,	such	as	vaccine	distribution,	quarantines,	
travel	restrictions,	and	border	closings,	national	
governments	should	decide	in	advance	how,	when,	
and	under	what	circumstances	to	do	so	given	the	
political	and	economic	consequences	of	implement-
ing	such	measures.	
Practice Makes Perfect
True,	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	the	Republic	of	
Korea	have	committed	resources	and	time	to	pre-
paring	for	a	pandemic,	but	despite	the	planning	
efforts,	numerous	questions	remain	unanswered.	
“How	are	our	partners	responding	to	the	emerg-
ing	threat?	What	is	everyone	doing?	Who	is	best	
equipped	to	do	what?	If	there	is	a	pandemic,	who	
do	we	call,	for	what,	and	when?”	wondered	one	
workshop	participant.	For	example,	the	“WHO	Pan-
demic	Influenza	Draft	Protocol	for	Rapid	Response	
and	Containment” (2006g)	outlines	recommended	
preparedness	actions	and	tasks	for	rapid	response,	
as	well	as	charts	an	activity	checklist	for	WHO	
assistance	and	access	to	the	global	stockpile	of	Tam-
iflu®,	but	few	governments	are	even	aware	of	such	
resources.	“We	need	to	understand	what	is	out	there,	
distinguish	who	is	the	most	prepared,	and	identify	
which	areas	are	the	most	vulnerable,”	added	anoth-
er	participant.	In	short,	pandemic	influenza	plans	
are	worthless	if	they	are	not	widely	understood	
and	accepted.	Tabletop	exercises,	simulations,	and	
workshops	are	the	most	effective	means	to	iron	
out	the	details	and	integrate	response	efforts.	The	
exchange	of	disaster	response	plans	helps	pinpoint	
weaknesses	and	identifies	the	gaps	and	opportu-
nities	for	enhanced	cooperation,	especially	since	
counties	and	regions	have	developed	different	
approaches	to	pandemic	influenza	planning.	“We	
need	to	scrutinize	each	other’s	plans	to	understand	
how	we	will	integrate	ourselves	in	response	to	a	
pandemic,”	stated	a	workshop	participant.
To	date,	South	Korea,	and	specifically	the	KCDC,	
has	taken	the	lead	in	organizing	regional	tabletop	
exercises	to	help	participants	refine	plans.	However,	
governments	could	conduct	more	exercises	and	pro-
mote	wider	participation.	Workshop	participants	
argued	for	additional	exercises,	especially	between	
the	United	States,	Japan,	and	South	Korea,	to	test	
an	avian	influenza	outbreak	scenario	in	the	Asia-
Pacific	theater.	Participants	also	stressed	the	need	
to	reach	out	to	other	regional	partners	and	stake-
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have	demonstrated	in	the	past	a	strong	capacity	to	
respond	to	catastrophic	disasters,	such	as	the	2004	
tsunami	and	the	2005	Pakistan	earthquake.	More-
over,	both	countries	have	intensified	regional	efforts	
to	prepare	for	a	pandemic	influenza.	For	exam-
ple,	Australia	and	Singapore	co-hosted	the	APEC	
round-the-clock	desktop	simulation	exercise	in	June	
2006	(APEC	Pandemic	Response	Exercise	2006),	
which	tested	regional	communication	networks.	In	
August	2006,	the	two	countries	also	co-sponsored	
a	lessons-learned	workshop.	A	preliminary	after-
action	report	was	circulated	to	APEC	economies	in	
November	2006.	Moreover,	Singapore	houses	the	
WHO	stockpile	of	antiviral	medications	and	protec-
tive	equipment	reserved	for	Southeast	Asia.
Although	the	WHO,	in	concert	with	governments	
and	civilian	agencies,	will	lead	the	international	
response	to	a	pandemic,	military	personnel	will	
assist	first	responders	in	initial	response	efforts.	
Given	the	military’s	expected	lead	role,	civil-mili-
tary	and	military-to-military	exercises	are	essential	
to	identifying	military	logistics,	resources,	and	
capabilities.	For	many	countries,	military	assets	
are	either	limited	or	restricted	from	use	and	there-
fore	unavailable	to	assist	first	responders	during	
the	initial	waves	of	attack.	Workshop	participants	
agreed	that	periodic	multilateral	training	and	com-
bined	planning	focused	on	military	relief	efforts	for	
a	pandemic	influenza	contingency	would	help	mil-
itaries	to	enhance	interoperability,	operationalize	
pandemic	influenza	response	plans,	and	implement	
the	lessons	learned	into	field	training	exercises.
Knowledge is Power
Timely	and	reliable	information	is	critical	to	effec-
tive	collaboration	and	coordination	among	regional	
and	multilateral	agencies,	partners,	and	foreign	
governments	and	militaries.	“Our	best	weapon	
is	information,	but	if	it	is	floating	around,	out	of	
date,	and	not	properly	assessed	or	broadcast,	then	
it	is	useless	and	unreliable,”	stressed	one	work-
shop	participant.	To	date,	multiple	government	
and	multilateral	agencies	have	launched	websites	
to	announce	information	on	the	avian	flu.	How-
ever,	each	website	has	tailored	the	information	to	
fit	its	audience.	To	see	the	big	picture	of	the	situa-
tion	around	the	world,	therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	
browse	through	dozens	of	internet	sites	and	por-
tals.	Although	the	WHO	website	includes	links	
to	pandemic	influenza	reports,	general	informa-
tion,	surveillance	and	infection	control	guidelines,	
national	influenza	pandemic	preparedness	plans,	
and	situation	country	updates,	it	is	not	a	clearing-
house	of	all	available	information.	Some	workshop	
participants	suggested	that	the	international	com-
munity	develop	an	unclassified	pandemic	influenza	
website	to	identify	country	capabilities,	list	best	
practices	and	approaches	for	risk	communication,	
reference	WHO,	government	and	military	points	
of	contact,	and	provide	on-the-ground	situation	
updates.	Others	suggested	that	such	a	site	include	
live	chat	rooms	to	accelerate	the	exchange	of	infor-
mation.	However,	a	website	in	which	individuals	
or	agencies	can	post	information	periodically	with-
out	first	developing	means	to	filter	that	information	
may	add	to	the	confusion	and	undermine	the	credi-
bility	of	the	information	posted.	On	the	other	hand,	
a	pandemic	influenza	website	modeled	on	a	cen-
tral	bank	or	information	clearinghouse	may	help	
enhance	information	sharing	and	improve	commu-
nication	networks.	Perhaps	an	even	better	solution	
would	be	to	improve	existing	networks,	specifically	
the	WHO	website,	to	meet	the	current	demands	for	
additional	information.	Although	countries	cannot	
depend	on	the	WHO	apparatus	alone	for	informa-
tion,	given	funding	constraints,	it	is	practical	to	
improve	existing	networks	rather	than	to	create	
an	entirely	new	information	resource.
The	Humanitarian	Information	Unit	within	the	
Bureau	for	Intelligence	and	Research	at	the	Unit-
ed	States	Department	of	State	has	been	working	
since	2002	on	creating	a	portal	to	share	unclas-
sified,	usable	information	across	the	government	
and	with	international	organizations,	NGOs,	and	
the	private	sector	in	preparation	for	and	response	
to	complex	humanitarian	emergencies	worldwide.	
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humanitarian	information	management	and	real-
time	satellite	imagery	of	migration	movements	or	
war-torn	areas.	
For	the	most	part,	public	awareness	and	media	
attention	to	date	have	remained	quite	low	despite	
the	increasing	numbers	of	human	infections	in	
2006.	Few	realize	that	the	total	number	of	deaths	
in	2006	is	equal	to	the	combined	deaths	in	2003-
05.	Even	fewer	are	aware	that	the	surge	of	human	
infections	in	the	past	few	months	has	come	out	of	
Indonesia,	or	that	the	recent	resurgence	of	the	virus	
in	wild	birds	in	China	and	Russia	suggests	that	the	
H5N1	virus	may	spread	northwestwards	(as	it	did	
in	late	2005)	and	appear	in	Central	and	Eastern	
Europe	in	time	for	the	next	influenza	season.	“I	
doubt	the	general	population,	or	their	governments	
and	leaders	for	that	matter,	really	know	much	about	
pandemic	influenza,”	posited	one	workshop	par-
ticipant.	
Since	a	pandemic	will	occur	community	by	
community,	public	action	in	anticipation	of	and	
in	response	to	local	outbreaks	of	avian	influenza	
can	help	mitigate	the	impact	and	spread	of	the	dis-
ease.	Specifically,	governments	should	engage	the	
public	as	partners	in	responding	to	avian	flu	inci-
dents	by	using	effective	education	tools,	providing	
timely	information	and	guidance,	and	encourag-
ing	voluntary	compliance	with	government	plans,	
including	school	closings,	home	quarantines,	and	
social	distancing	measures.	Moreover,	education	
materials	for	preventing	the	spread	of	H5N1	in	ani-
mals	and	for	limiting	human	exposure	through	
improved	sanitation	of	backyard	farms,	proper	
hygiene,	and	self-reporting	will	help	contain	the	
virus.	As	demonstrated	during	the	SARS	outbreak,	
public	awareness	campaigns	that	encourage	self-
reporting	and	screening	of	influenza-like	illnesses	
reduces	the	time	between	symptom	onset	and	case	
detection.	In	addition,	new	equipment	and	technol-
ogy	for	thermal	screening	at	exit	and	entry	points	
were	developed	and	public	hotlines	were	activated	
to	ensure	quick	information	sharing.	For	example,	
Thailand	has	adopted	such	an	approach	by	appoint-
ing	individuals	in	villages	to	report	cases	of	sick	
poultry.	Similarly,	governments	should	encourage	
local	health	officials	to	notify	national	authorities	
as	soon	as	preliminary	information	suggests	a	sus-
tained	human-to-human	transmission	of	the	H5N1	
virus.	However,	one	workshop	participant	warned,	
“Community	plans	are	critical,	but	there	is	no	con-
tainment	strategy	if	the	virus	strain	breaks	out	in	
a	major	city.	National	authorities	should	support	
local	communities,	but	also	prepare	worst-case	sce-
nario	contingency	plans.”
Vaccines are Not 
Magic Bullets
Since	influenza	viruses	constantly	mutate,	experts	
agree	that	no	vaccine	will	provide	complete	pro-
tection	against	a	pandemic,	especially	since	severe	
shortages	are	expected	during	the	initial	waves	of	
avian	and	human	influenza	outbreak.	In	fact,	scien-
tists	recently	discovered	a	new	variant	of	the	H5N1	
virus	in	southern	China	that	appears	to	sidestep	
current	vaccines	in	poultry.	Nevertheless,	coun-
tries	continue	to	pour	resources	into	animal	and	
human	vaccine	research	and	development.	The	
United	States,	for	example,	has	committed	over	
$1	billion	to	vaccine	development.	In	October	
2006,	the	WHO	warned	that	the	world	was	bil-
lions	of	doses	short	of	the	vaccine	amount	needed	
to	prepare	for	pandemic	influenza	and	urged	the	
international	community	to	boost	vaccine	yields	
and	production	capacity	from	$2	billion	to	$9	bil-
lion	(APEC	EINet	2006).	One	could	question	the	
rationale	for	investing	so	much	money	into	vacci-
nation	programs	given	the	likelihood	that	the	virus	
will	mutate	and	the	competing	financial	demands	
for	other	preventive	measures,	such	as	improved	
surveillance	techniques,	containment	strategies,	
and	laboratory	data	systems.
Cash is King
At	the	International	Pledging	Conference	in	Beijing,	
the	international	community	pledged	over	$1.9	bil-
lion	in	aid,	but	the	total	amount	disbursed	to	date	is	
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developing	countries	in	Africa,	the	Middle	East,	
and	Latin	America	only	received	a	few	million	dol-
lars	of	the	pledge	money	despite	their	evident	lack	
of	resources	to	prepare	for	a	pandemic.	Although	
developing	countries	will	receive	some	of	the	funds	
donated	to	international	agencies,	the	WHO,	FAO,	
and	OIE	will	prioritize	recipient	countries	accord-
ing	to	risk.	For	now,	the	most	at-risk	countries	are	
in	Asia.	“We	forget	that	an	outbreak	outside	our	
respective	borders	is	as	much	of	a	threat	to	us	as	
an	outbreak	within	our	borders.	Are	we	prepared	
to	respond	to	an	avian	flu	incident	in	Africa?”	won-
dered	one	workshop	participant.	UN	agencies	have	
introduced	some	long-term	prevention	strategies	to	
minimize	the	risk	of	human	avian	influenza	and	
reduce	the	threat	of	future	infectious	disease	out-
breaks,	such	as	increasing	human	and	food	safety,	
improving	rural	development,	strengthening	veter-
inary	controls,	monitoring	the	trade	and	marketing	
of	live	chickens,	and	restructuring	the	farming	
industries	to	improve	bio-security,	but	immediate	
response	mechanisms	remain	scarce.	Following	
the	first	outbreaks	of	avian	flu	in	Africa,	for	exam-
ple,	about	twenty	countries	received	only	$45,000	
each	in	emergency	funds,	with	an	additional	$1.5	
million	promised	to	both	Nigeria	and	Ethiopia	for	
the	purchase	of	technical	and	disease	surveillance	
equipment	(FAO	2006c).	Such	inequities,	coupled	
with	the	continent’s	inadequate	access	to	education,	
economic	resources,	and	healthcare	services	may	
allow	the	avian	flu	virus	to	spread	unchecked	and	
eventually	threaten	countries	beyond	its	borders.	
Efforts	to	mobilize	additional	resources	for	the	
WHO	also	have	been	weak	despite	the	agency’s	role	
in	leading	the	international	response	to	pandemic	
influenza.	For	example,	the	total	money	pledged	–	
though	not	yet	disbursed	–	to	the	WHO	in	Beijing	
was	$77	million.	However,	funding	requirements	
for	2006-07	reached	$100	million,	not	including	the	
cost	of	vaccine	research	and	development	(WHO	
2006h).	Funding	shortfalls	such	as	these	increase	
the	potential	for	an	isolated	avian	flu	outbreak	to	
develop	into	a	widespread	pandemic.	Although	the	
United	Nations	and	the	World	Bank	recommend-
ed	the	international	community	raise	an	additional	
$1.3	billion	to	$1.6	billion	at	the	Bamako	ministeri-
al	conference	in	December	2006	to	fight	H5N1	over	
the	next	two	to	three	years,	only	$476	million	was	
pledged	(Associated	Press	2006a,	2006c).
Hidden Threats
Over	and	above	the	devastating	health	and	eco-
nomic	impact	of	a	potential	influenza	pandemic,	
additional	threats	could	arise	to	menace	global	
security.	For	example,	how	does	the	international	
community	respond	to	countries	that	fail	to	report	
avian	flu	incidents?	Some	experts	claim	that	the	
Indonesian	government	was	aware	of	the	presence	
of	H5N1	in	the	country	for	two	years,	but	failed	
to	slaughter	poultry	in	infected	areas.	Indonesian	
officials	only	reported	incidents	of	avian	flu	once	
humans	were	infected.	International	health	author-
ities	have	also	suspected	China	of	underreporting	
avian	flu	incidents	in	poultry	and	humans.	The	lack	
of	transparency	on	avian	flu	issues	in	some	coun-
tries	dramatically	increases	the	risk	of	a	sustained	
human-to-human	transmission	of	the	H5N1	virus.
Military	planners	present	at	the	workshop	also	
agreed	that	pandemic	contingency	plans	should	
perhaps	account	for	scenarios	in	which	terror-
ists	use	H5N1	as	a	weapon.	Terrorists	could	easily	
exploit	a	pandemic	influenza	outbreak	and	inflict	
widespread	damage	by	using	their	own	bodies	to	
attack	and	spread	the	virus	among	dense	popula-
tions.	Moreover,	outbreaks	of	avian	influenza	in	
hermit	or	isolated	countries,	such	as	North	Korea	
or	Iran,	also	pose	a	significant	risk	to	neighboring	
countries	and	regions.		 	
The Way Ahead
Rapid	detection	and	response	efforts	will	determine	
the	extent	to	which	a	human-to-human	transmis-
sion	of	H5N1	can	be	contained,	which	requires	
efficient	coordination	among	the	initially	affect-
ed	nation,	responsible	international	agencies,	and	
other	countries	in	the	region	assisting	as	needed.	
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and	South	Korea	will	play	a	key	role	(along	with	a	
few	other	countries	such	as	Australia	and	Singa-
pore),	working	in	support	of	the	affected	nation	
and	UN	agencies,	and	they	can	function	more	
effectively	if	they	respond	as	a	well-prepared	and	
well-coordinated	core	group.	In	order	to	prepare	
themselves,	the	core	group	nations’	ministries	of	
foreign	affairs,	health,	and	defense,	along	with	for-
eign	officials	and	forces	stationed	abroad,	should	
spend	time	as	a	group	to	consider	their	respective	
roles	in	implementing	rapid	containment	mea-
sures.	
Beyond	core	group	cooperation	in	support	of	
affected	countries,	the	United	States,	Japan,	and	
South	Korea	share	a	unique	situation	in	the	region	
such	that	U.S.	military	forces	(and	their	families)	
are	permanently	stationed	in	those	two	countries.	
Will	the	Japanese	and	ROK	governments	request	
assistance	from	U.S.	forces	stationed	within	their	
borders?	How	will	such	response	efforts	be	coor-
dinated	with	government	officials	and	national	
defense	forces?	Moreover,	if	military	personnel	
are	to	support	civilian	agencies	in	initial	response	
efforts,	 then	 national	 pandemic	 preparedness	
plans	should	address	in	more	detail	the	potential	
role	of	the	military,	the	rules	of	engagement,	the	
legal	or	constitutional	constraints	on	the	use	of	
military	equipment	and	personnel,	as	well	as	the	
expectations	of	host	nations	and	civil	authorities.	
Particularly,	government	officials	should	consider	
how	military	forces	stationed	abroad	will	respond	
to	requests	for	assistance	from	host	nations.	
U.S.	troops	stationed	in	Japan	and	South	Korea,	
for	example,	are	prepared	to	support	host	gov-
ernments	(if	requested)	with	rapid	containment	
operations	 when	 directed	 by	 the	 secretary	 of	
defense.	After	all,	many	of	their	own	family	mem-
bers	will	be	living	in	the	affected	communities	–	not	
to	mention	the	number	of	local	residents	that	work	
on	U.S.	military	installations,	so	it	will	be	difficult	
to	separate	U.S.	bases	from	the	response	equation.	
Moreover,	military	bases	have	vital	resources,	such	
as	medical	personnel	and	equipment,	which	may	
assist	the	local	community	during	the	initial	phases	
of	the	potential	health	crisis.	However,	the	extent	
of	U.S.	assistance	is	uncertain	given	the	compet-
ing	demands	to	focus	on	force	health	protection,	
maintain	operational	readiness,	and	support	U.S.	
domestic	 containment	 operations	 for	 pandem-
ic	influenza.	Government	officials	and	military	
planners	should	address	these	issues	now	to	avoid	
any	misunderstandings	or	loose	critical	time	dur-
ing	initial	response	efforts	of	a	human-to-human	
outbreak	of	H5N1.	
As	discussed	earlier	in	this	report,	each	coun-
try	has	adopted	a	different	military	strategy	for	
pandemic	influenza	response.	How	will	troops	
stationed	abroad	respond	to	requests	for	assis-
tance?	How	will	host	countries	respond	to	offers	
of	assistance?	How	will	host	nations	react	to	the	
evacuation	 of	 foreign	 noncombatants	 through	
their	territory?	How	will	host	nations	respond	to	
an	outbreak	of	a	sustained	human-to-human	trans-
mission	of	the	H5N1	virus	on	a	foreign	military	
base?	Will	foreign	militaries	assist	host	nations	
during	phase	6?	How	will	host	and	foreign	mil-
itary	services	enforce	quarantines	or	maintain	
the	rule	of	law?	How	will	foreign	militaries	pri-
oritize	multiple	requests	for	assistance?	Central	
and	local	government	officials	should	work	with	
military	installations	to	coordinate	response	plans	
and	address	such	issues.	Militaries	need	a	better	
understanding	of	the	mandate	and	plan	for	human-
itarian	assistance	and	disaster	response	missions.	
Militaries	also	need	to	identify	the	logistical	and	
infrastructural	capabilities	of	the	nations	request-
ing	assistance	in	order	to	match	the	needs	of	the	
afflicted	area.	Tabletop	exercises,	particularly	mil-
itary-to-military	and	multilateral	exchanges,	help	
planners	identify	the	expectations	of	host	nations	
and	address	the	different	political	and	legal	dimen-
sions	of	a	military	response	to	pandemic	influenza.	
Most	workshop	participants	agreed	that	periodic	
training	focused	on	disaster	relief	efforts	would	be	
beneficial,	as	well	as	standardized	operating	pro-
cedures	and	memoranda	of	understanding	on	the	
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In	addition	to	improving	military-to-mil-
itary	coordination,	institutional	linkages	among	
animal	 and	 human	 health	 experts	 should	 be	
strengthened	to	improve	information	exchange	
across	 laboratory	 and	 communicable-disease	
networks.	Moreover,	partnerships	with	all	stake-
holders	in	the	public	and	private	sectors	should	be	
developed	to	ensure	national	and	regional	coordi-
nation	for	pandemic	response.	Partnerships	with	
the	private	sector,	(such	as	tourism,	communica-
tions,	food	suppliers,	airline	industries,	financial	
services,	and	other	trade	and	industry),	encourage	
business	continuity	plans,	maintain	public	confi-
dence,	and	mitigate	the	negative	economic	impact	
of	a	pandemic	influenza.	Moreover,	partnerships	
with	pharmaceutical	manufacturers	increase	the	
capacity	of	nations	and	regions	to	stockpile	vaccines	
and	other	treatment	medications.	Partnerships	
with	nongovernmental	organizations,	such	as	the	
United	Way	and	the	Red	Cross,	also	guarantee	addi-
tional	support	services	in	meeting	the	basic	food,	
shelter,	and	medical	needs	of	individuals	isolated	
or	quarantined	during	a	pandemic.	Raising	public	
awareness	and	engaging	the	public	as	partners	also	
increases	the	effectiveness	of	and	compliance	with	
government	containment	measures.
Finally,	 the	 recommendations	 for	 pan-
demic	influenza	preparedness	planning	have	wider	
biodefense	policy	implications.	Improving	laborato-
ry	surveillance	techniques	and	risk	communication	
networks,	drafting	business	continuity	and	emer-
gency	response	plans,	strengthening	regional	and	
multilateral	networks,	enhancing	interoperability,	
and	creating	information-sharing	systems	help	pre-
vent	and	control	other	security	challenges,	including	
natural	disasters,	terrorism,	and	any	future	biologi-
cal	and	chemical	threats.	Such	threats	demand	the	
same	planning	and	response	as	pandemic	influen-
za,	that	is,	a	focus	on	threat	awareness,	prevention,	
surveillance,	detection,	and	recovery.	Whether	the	
international	community	is	prepared	to	meet	such	
future	challenges	depends	on	the	planning	and	
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Date / Location Meeting / Exercise Description
2007
New Delhi, India
International Partnership 
on Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza (IPAPI)
IPAPI delegates will convene in New Delhi in 2007 to review internation-
al preparedness plans for a potential human pandemic, discuss means to 
enhance international coordination, and address funding needs. 
Dec. 6-8, 2006
Bamako, Mali
The Bamako Ministerial 
Conference
The International Ministerial Conference in Bamako organized by the Inter-African  
Bureau for Animal Resources of the African Union AU/IBAR in coordination with the 
European Union, the European Commission, and several technical agencies of the 
United Nations. The meeting’s objectives included: 1) strengthen the global partner-
ship against avian and pandemic influenza; 2) review what has been achieved since 
the January 2006 Beijing conference; 3) share technical experience; and 4) mobi-
lize additional resources through an international pledging conference at Bamako. 
Oct. 11-13, 2006
Seoul, ROK
Crisis Response Exercise 
for Pandemic Influenza
Tabletop exercise and international workshop on pandemic influenza with over 250 par-
ticipants from the South Korean Ministry of Health, KCDC, and central and provincial 
governments. The exercise also included over 50 observers and international experts from 
the WHO, UN, World Bank, U.S., Germany, APEC economies, RAND, and private the sector.
Sept. 27, 2006
Tokyo, Japan
Pandemic Influenza 
Workshop: Multilateral 
Perspectives on Preparedness, 
Response Planning, and 
Areas for Cooperation
Government officials, military officers, and foreign policy experts from the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea gathered to discuss the threat of a potential pan-
demic influenza crisis; share national strategies and military response plans; and 
explore options for launching a coordinated regional response to a possible avian 
flu outbreak in the Asia-Pacific theater. The workshop was co-sponsored by the 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Institute of World Studies at Takushoku 
University, and PACOM with the support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Sept. 26, 2006
Videoconference
Communications Planning A videoconference-based seminar on communications planning organized by the U.S. CDC, 
the World Bank, UNICEF, WHO, and other partners. The aim of the seminar was to help 
refine each country’s own response and communications plans and establish a region-
al health communications network. Participating countries included Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Laos, Japan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, and the United States.
Sept. 25, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
WHO Influenza Pandemic 
Task Force (IPTF)
This task force is a temporary body whose mission is to advise the WHO on 
potential public health issues of international concern related to avian and pan-
demic influenza until the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) 
come into force on June 15, 2007. The task force met for the first time to 
iron out administrative issues, such as its role and responsibilities.
Sept. 10-11, 2006
Da Nang, Vietnam
APEC Health Task 
Force Symposium on 
Functioning Economies 
in Times of Pandemic
APEC leaders met to discuss the potential economic consequences of a pan-
demic influenza and identify strategies to minimize its economic impact.
Aug. 14-15, 2006
Singapore
Lessons from Avian Influenza 
Pandemic Exercise
The governments of Singapore and Australia co-sponsored a lessons-learned work-
shop of the APEC Pandemic Response Exercise 2006 held on June 7-8, 2006.
July 18-20, 2006
Manila, 
Philippines
First Meeting of the Asia Pacific 
Technical Advisory Group on 
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Officials from the regional office for the western Pacific gathered to estab-
lish the technical advisory group, discuss pandemic preparedness and 
other emerging infectious diseases, and review the IHR 2005. 
Appendix A:
International Meetings 
on Avian Flu
The	following	table	lists	key	regional	and	multinational	meetings,	workshops,	and	exercises	on	avian	
influenza	in	the	past	year.	Not	all	events	focused	on	pandemic	influenza	are	represented	in	the	table	
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June 20-23, 2006
Jakarta, Indonesia
Avian Influenza Expert 
Consultation Meeting
Three-day international consultation meeting between Indonesia’s Health and 
Agriculture ministries, the WHO, FAO, UNICEF, U.S. CDC, Japan’s NIID, and other experts 
to review the status of the H5N1 virus in humans and animals; review the lessons 
learned for rapid response and containment; and provide an authoritative risk assess-
ment of avian influenza in Indonesia in light of the recent cluster of human H5N1 cases.
June 20-22, 2006
Honolulu, Hawaii
Tabletop Exercise Individuals from PACOM, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and other U.S. gov-
ernment agencies, including medical professionals, operational planners, and 
communication and technical experts, conducted a three-day tabletop exer-
cise to explore means for enhancing interagency coordination and discuss 
strategies to prevent and contain a pandemic influenza outbreak of H5N1. 
June 7-8, 2006 APEC Pandemic Response 
Exercise 2006
Australia and Singapore co-hosted a round-the-clock desktop simulation exer-
cise to test regional communication preparedness during an influenza pandemic. 
All twenty-one APEC member countries participated in the simulation. 
June 6-7,2006
Vienna, Austria
International Partnership on 
Avian and Pandemic Influenza: 
Vienna Senior Official Meeting
As a follow-up to the IPAPI meeting in October 2005, officials gathered to dis-
cuss the status of human influenza pandemic preparedness and review the 
status of the pledges made at the January 2006 Beijing conference. 
May 4-6, 2006
Da Nang, Vietnam
APEC Ministerial Meeting on 
Avian and Influenza Pandemics
At the ministerial meeting, member countries adopted the APEC Action Plan 
on the Prevention and Response to Avian and Influenza Pandemics, which 
addresses means to improve risk communication, enhance regional coordina-
tion, and assure the continuity of essential services during a pandemic.
May 4-5, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
WHO Meeting on Clinical 
Trials of Influenza Vaccines
Representatives from the vaccine industry and researchers from univer-
sities and academic institutions with ongoing pandemic vaccine clinical 
trials met to evaluate clinical trials for pandemic vaccines. This meeting was 
a follow-up to the WHO meeting held in November 2005.
May 3, 2006
Hong Kong
Business Continuity Planning 
and Disaster Preparedness 
for Avian Influenza
The APEC Business Advisory Council met with international health experts and business 
leaders to highlight the importance of business continuity planning and addressed how 
small and medium-sized companies could prepare for an avian flu pandemic. Over 300 
representatives from multinational corporations and small-to-medium sized enterprises 
attended the meeting, including FedEx, Deutsche Bank, and American International Group.
May 2-3, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
WHO Consultations on 
Influenza Vaccines
Influenza experts, representatives from national immunization programs 
and national regulatory authorities, and human vaccine manufacturers from 
both industrialized and developing countries met to discuss the development 
of a global action plan for increasing pandemic vaccine supply.
May 2-3, 2006
Da Nang, Vietnam
APEC Pandemic Preparedness 
Communication Workshop
Sponsored by the Canadian government, over 60 representatives from APEC econo-
mies met to explore the role of risk communications during a pandemic. Participants 
discussed strategies for enhancing public awareness campaigns and build-
ing risk communication capacity at the local, national, and regional levels.
April 27, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
WHO/OIE/FAO Consultations 
on Influenza Vaccines
The UN agencies conducted consultations on the technical feasibility of human 
vaccine production in veterinary vaccine production facilities during a pandem-
ic. Representatives included national regulatory agencies for both human and 
veterinary influenza vaccines and veterinary influenza vaccine producers
March 20, 2006
Libreville, Gabon
UN System Meeting 
on Avian Influenza
The government of Gabon, FAO, WHO, UNDP, and OCHA co-organized a region-
al meeting of the UN systems on the avian influenza situation in Africa in an attempt 
to raise awareness, strengthen partnerships in Africa and between African coun-
tries and other bilateral and multilateral partners, and mobilize human and 
financial resources pending contributions from the international community.
March 17, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
WHO Technical Meetings: 
1. Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and 
Mitigation on Refugee and 
Displaced Populations
2. Social Mobilization
The WHO met with humanitarian agency partners including other UN agen-
cies, international organizations and NGOs to finalize guidelines for pandemic 
influenza preparedness among refugee and displaced populations and address 
key issues surrounding detection, response, containment, and impact mitiga-
tion. In a second technical meeting, the WHO, FAO, and UNICEF met to discuss 
how best to develop clear public health communication campaigns. Appendices		|		The Pandemic Influenza Challenge	 apx:
March 6-8, 2006
Geneva, 
Switzerland
International Meeting 
on Influenza Pandemic 
Containment Strategy
The WHO convened a three-day technical meeting of international public health 
experts to discuss rapid response strategy in the event of an influenza pandemic. 
The meeting focused on operations (i.e., logistics), surveillance and epidemiolo-
gy, and public health measures (e.g., quarantines and antiviral medications).
Feb. 14-16, 2006
Bangkok, Thailand
Asia Regional Risk and 
Emergency Communication for 
Avian Influenza and Pandemic 
Preparedness Workshop
Communications officers from health, agriculture, education, information and cul-
ture ministries and country representatives from the national pandemic influenza 
planning process gathered to improve communications tools, plan for a regional 
health communications consortium, and coordinate public awareness campaigns. 
Participating countries included Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. Representatives from ASEAN, U.S. CDC, WHO, and FAO were also present.
Jan. 17-18, 2006
Beijing, China
International Pledging 
Conference on Avian and 
Human Influenza
The government of China, the European Commission, and the World Bank, in coor-
dination with the WHO, FAO, and OIE, co-sponsored an international pledging 
conference to follow up the launch of the International Partnership on Avian and 
Pandemic Influenza. At this conference, the international community pledged 
$1.9 billion in aid to stockpile protective equipment, improve communication net-
works, and develop capacity-building measures such as laboratory diagnostics.
Jan. 12-13, 2006
Tokyo, Japan
Japan-WHO Joint Meeting on 
Early Response to Potential 
Influenza Pandemic
The Japanese government and the WHO organized a meeting to discuss the early 
response measures that should be implemented if a pandemic emerges, recommend 
regional and international mechanisms (including early detection, operation-
al support, and stockpiles), and recommend necessary actions to address major 
issues and challenges associated with implementing early response measures.
Dec. 14, 2005
Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia
East Asia Summit At the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit (EAS), EAS leaders endorsed 
the East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and 
Response, which committed participating countries to contain avian influen-
za and increase bilateral and multilateral cooperation in areas such as surveillance, 
research and development, risk communications, and vaccine production.
Nov. 18-19, 2005
Busan, ROK
13th APEC Economic 
Leaders Meeting
The twenty-one members of APEC adopted the APEC Initiative on Preparing 
for and Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic, which committed all APEC mem-
bers to develop national influenza preparedness plans by November 2006.
Nov. 15-16, 2005,
Where?
U.S. Pacific Command 
Tabletop Exercise
U.S. Pacific Command hosted a tabletop exercise to test military readiness and 
response. The exercise included over 125 military and civilian participants from 
U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Korea, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Health 
Affairs, the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Homeland 
Security, the Hawaii Public Health Department, U.S. Central Command, and CDC.
Nov. 7-9, 2005
Geneva, 
Switzerland
Global Meeting on 
Avian Influenza and 
Human Pandemic
The WHO, FAO, OIE, and World Bank co-sponsored a meeting on avian influ-
enza and human pandemic to discuss a strategy to control avian influenza in 
animals, support national preparedness plans, review national, bilateral, and 
multilateral initiatives, and outline coordination mechanisms necessary at the 
national, sub-regional, regional, and global levels. The meeting included represen-
tatives from national governments, donor partners, and regional organizations.
Oct. 31 - Nov. 
1, 2005
Brisbane, Australia
Avian and Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response
The meeting gathered, for the first time, principal pandemic/disaster management 
coordinators from the 21 APEC economies. Participants met to identify ways in which 
the APEC economies might further cooperate in the event of an outbreak of avian 
influenza. Observers at the meeting included representatives of the WHO, FAO, OIE, 
ASEAN Secretariat, International Red Cross, and APEC Business Advisory Council
Oct. 24-25, 2005
Ottawa, Canada
Global Pandemic Influenza 
Readiness: International 
Meeting of Ministers of Health
The government of Canada hosted an international meeting of health ministers to enhance 
global planning and collaboration on pandemic influenza. Delegates from over 30 coun-
tries and representatives from 9 international organizations attended this meeting.
Oct. 6-7, 2005
Washington, D.C.
International Partnership 
on Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza (IPAPI)
Foreign officers, health and agriculture officials, and representatives from 88 countries and 
9 international organizations, including the WHO, FAO, OIE, World Bank, APEC, and ASEAN, 
attended the implementation meeting of IPAPI. Participants identified three priority areas 
for collaboration: 1) stockpiling antiviral drugs and supplies, 2) developing vaccines and 
distribution plans, and 3) implementing rapid response and containment measures.apx:	 The Pandemic Influenza Challenge
07:30-08:30  Breakfast at the International House (Lecture Hall)
08:30-08:45  Welcome and Introduction (I-House Lecture Hall)
•  Professor Satoshi MORIMOTO, Director, Institute of World Studies at Takushoku University
•  Rear Admiral Thomas K. BURKHARD, USN, Surgeon, J07, United States Pacific Command
•  Mr. Jim SCHOFF, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Session 1: The Pandemic Influenza Crisis
08:45-10:00  The purpose of this session is to discuss the nature of a potential pandemic influenza crisis and frame the key issues 
to be considered in greater depth during the workshop. Panelists will briefly outline the emergency response, plan-
ning, and containment activities already under development and point to areas that require additional attention 
and reflection. Since the Pacific region is the most susceptible to a potential pandemic influenza outbreak, there is 
a pressing need for the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to take the lead in planning for a regional or 
multilateral response to this crisis.
Key topics for this session include:
•  World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines and recommendations for prevention, response planning, surveil-
lance, and containment
•  Planning activities and the role of national governments, military, international, regional, and multilateral agen-
cies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector (e.g. pharmaceutical companies and companies that 
operate critical services and infrastructure)
•  Multilateral opportunity to prevent, contain, respond to, and manage an outbreak in order to minimize the 
health, economic, social, and security impacts of a pandemic
Presenters: 
•  Dr. Hitoshi  OSHITANI, M.D., Professor, Department of Virology, Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine, and 
former WHO official in Manila
•  Dr. LEE Duk-Hyoung, M.D., Director General, Center for Epidemic Surveillance and Response, Korea Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Ministry of Health and Welfare
10:00-10:15  Tea/Coffee Break (I-House Lecture Hall)
Session 2: National Strategies for Pandemic Influenza
10:15-12:00  The goal of this session is to review the national strategies of the governments of Japan, Korea, and the United States 
in order to understand each country’s response planning and identify key areas for improvement, support, and coop-
eration. This session will also review the lessons learned from past disasters and recent simulations, such as the APEC 
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Pandemic Response Exercise in June 2006. 
Key topics for this session include:
•  Logistics, capabilities, and plans for the continuity of critical resources, such as government, healthcare, commu-
nication, transport, infrastructure, trade and commerce, public works, utilities, and energy services
•  International efforts and areas for joint collaboration, such as bio-medical surveillance, crisis coordination, anti-
viral and vaccine distribution
•  Coordination with the World Health Organization, United Nations, and the International Partnership on Avian 
and Pandemic Influenza
Presenters:
•  Dr. Ken STALEY, M.D., Director for Biodefense Policy, White House Homeland Security Council
•  Dr. HUR Young Joo, M.D., Director of the Division of Epidemic Intelligence Service, Department of Disease Investigation 
and Surveillance, Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Ministry of Health and Welfare
•  Dr. KANARI Yumiko, M.D., Technical Officer, Tuberculosis and Infectious Disease Control Division, Health Service Bureau, 
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
12:00-13:00  Buffet Lunch (I-House, Kabayama Room, B1F)
Session 3: Military Preparedness and Response Plans for Pandemic Influenza
13:00-14:45  In the event of a pandemic influenza, military personnel will support civilian agencies in initial response efforts. This 
session will review the military planning efforts of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. A particular emphasis 
will be given to the lessons learned from past disasters, simulations, and tabletop exercises.
Key topics for this session include:
•	 Enhancing partnership capabilities and improving interoperability
•	 Military logistics, resources, and infectious disease control measures, such as surveillance and antiviral medica-
tion and vaccine distribution plans
•	 Force health protection measures to maintain operational readiness
•	 Ensuring the ability to continue regional transportation of essential goods and personnel by developing precau-
tionary measures that are commonly understood, and implementing them in a manner that is trusted across 
countries and organizations
•	 Assessment of military exercises and simulations 
Presenters:
•	 Lieutenant Colonel Clay SUTTON, J57, United States Pacific Command
•	 Dr. YANAGIDA Yasuo, Assistant Director, Health and Medical Division Bureau of Personnel and Education, Japan 
Defense Agency
•	 Lieutenant Colonel PARK In Ho, ROK AFMC, Chief of Preventive Medicine, Armed Forces Medical Command
14:45-15:00  Tea/Coffee Break 
Session 4:  Areas of Enhanced Cooperation and Response Planning
15:00-17:00  The purpose of this session is to engage all participants in an open discussion on the areas for improvement and 
enhanced cooperation. 
Topics for this session include:
•	 Identification of essential tasks, priorities, gaps, and opportunities for government and military cooperation
•	 Future joint and combined exercises, training, and follow-on workshops
•	 Regional crisis coordination centers
•	 Enabling civil-military cooperation
Some designated commentators from each country will provide brief observations of the day’s dialogue before 
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17:00-17:30  Executive Summary and Final Comments 
•	 Mr. Jim SCHOFF, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
•	 Brigadier General Steven A. HUMMER, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Hawaii and Deputy 
Commander, Marine Forces Pacific
•	 Dr. KAWAKAMI Takashi, Professor, Institute of World Studies at Takushoku University
18:00-21:00  Cocktail Reception and Buffet DinnerThe Pandemic Influenza Challenge	 apx:
JAPAN
Mr. BANNO Akihiko
Official, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Commander DOMOTO Hideharu, MC, JMSDF
Medical Staff, Office of Surgeon General and 
Director of Medicine, Maritime Staff Office
Japan Defense Agency
Rear Admiral FUJITA Kazuyuki, MC, JMSDF
Surgeon General and Director of Medicine
Maritime Staff Office, Japan Defense Agency
Rear Admiral HATADA Junichi, MC, JMSDF
Commanding Officer
SDF Hospital Yokosuka
Mr. HORIE Yoshiteru
Secretary General / Managing Director
Association for Aid and Relief, Japan
Dr. KANARI Yumiko, M.D. 
Technical Officer, Tuberculosis and Infectious Disease 
Control Division, Health Service Bureau
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
Dr. KAWAKAMI Takashi
Professor, Institute of World Studies
Takushoku University
Dr. KISO, Keisuke, M.D.
Director, Health and Medical Division
Japan Defense Agency
Ms. KONO Minako
Policy Coordination Division
Foreign Policy Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Lieutenant Colonel KURIHARA
Deputy Director for Logistics (Medical), J-4 Staff
Mr. MARUYAMA Ichiro
Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator
Foreign Policy Bureau, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. MORI Hirohisa
Deputy Director, Health and Medical Division 
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Japan Defense Agency
Professor MORIMOTO Satoshi
Director, Institute of World Studies
Faculty of International Development
Takushoku University
Ms. NAKAJIMA Chie
Official, Specialized Agencies Division
International Cooperation Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. OSHIMA Noriko
Official, Status of U.S. Forces Agreement Division, 
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. OSHITANI Hitoshi, M.D.
Professor, Department of Virology
Tohoku University Graduate School of Medicine
Dr. SATO Heigo
Professor, Institute of World Studies
Takushoku University
Lieutenant Colonel TANIDA Tadashi, JGSDF
Defense Policy Division, Bureau of Defense 
Japan Defense Agency
Dr. TANIGUCHI, Kiyosu M.D. 
Chief, Infectious Disease Surveillance Center
National Institute of Infectious Diseases
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
Mr. TOKUCHI Hideshi
Director, Tokyo Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, Defense 
Facilities Administration Agency Japan Defense Agency
Lieutenant General YAMAGUCHI Noboru, JGSDF
Commanding General
GSDF Research and Development Command
Ms. YAMAMOTO Rika
Chief, Programming Unit
Peace Winds Japan
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Dr. YAMAMOTO Taro, M.D.
Deputy Director, Global Issues Cooperation 
Division, International Cooperation Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Captain YANAGIDA Shigeki, MC, JMSDF
Senior Medical Staff, Office of Surgeon General and 
Director of Medicine, Maritime Staff Office
Japan Defense Agency
Dr. YANAGIDA Yasuo
Assistant Director, Health and Medical Division 
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Japan Defense Agency
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Dr. CHA Du-Hyeogn
Research Fellow
Director of Defense Issues Task Force
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Captain HONG Jee Young, ROKA
Action Officer, Preventive Medicine
Health Policy Team, Health and Welfare Bureau
Ministry of National Defense
First Lieutenant HUH Sik, ROK AFMC
Patient Statistics Analysis Officer
Health Operations Division
Armed Forces Medical Command
Dr. HUR Yong, M.D.
Director General, Incheon Airport National Quarantine Station
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Dr. HUR Young Joo, M.D.
Director, Division of Epidemic Intelligence Service, Department 
of Disease Investigation and Surveillance
Korea Center for Disease Control & Prevention
Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Mr. KANG Sung-Heup
Director, Health Policy Team
Health and Welfare Bureau
Ministry of National Defense
Mr. KIM Jin-hae
First Secretary
Embassy of the Republic of Korea, Tokyo
Major General KIM Rock Kwon, ROK AFMC
Commander
Armed Forces Medical Command
Dr. LEE Duk-Hyoung, M.D.
Director General, Center for Epidemic Surveillance and Response
Korea Center for Disease Control & Prevention
Ministry of Health and Welfare
Dr. LEE Seoksoo
Professor, Korean National Defense University
Lieutenant Colonel PARK In Ho, ROK AFMC
Chief of Preventive Medicine
Armed Forces Medical Command
Mr. PARK Young-kyu 
Deputy Director, Security Policy Division
Policy Planning Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Major SEO, Man Kil ROK AFHSS
Chief of the Multiple Clinical Support Division
Armed Forces Health Service School
UNITED STATES
Lieutenant Colonel Peter G. BREED, USAF
Chief, Force Health Protection, J07
United States Pacific Command
Commander Kari A. BUCHANAN, USN
Director for Public Health Services
US Naval Hospital Yokosuka
United States Forces Japan
Rear Admiral Thomas BURKHARD, USN
Surgeon, J07
United States Pacific Command
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth CHRISTOPHER, USN
Deputy Command Surgeon
United States Forces Korea
Mr. Bart D. COBBS 
Deputy Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology
Embassy of the United States of America, Tokyo 
Mr. John Du TOIT
Korea Desk Officer
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J5
United States Pacific Command
Mr. Michael K. EVENSON
Director, Operations Enterprise
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Brigadier General Steven A. HUMMER, USMC
Commanding General, Marine Corps Base HI
Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Pacific
Lieutenant Colonel Bret JACKMAN, USMC
Marine Forces Pacific, G5
Mr. Frank JANNUZI
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Council on Foreign Relations (on leave from the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee)
Colonel (Ret) Cha O. KOO, M.D., USA
Deputy Commander for Host Nation Affairs
18th Medical Command
United States Forces Korea
Major Michelle C. McLAUGHLIN, USA
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J57
United States Pacific Command
Mr. Ed PECHOUS
Institute for Defense Analyses
Dr. Charles M. PERRY
Vice President and Director of Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Colonel Mark A. PRESSON, USAF
Commander, 374th Medical Group
Command Surgeon, USFJ / 5th Air Force
United States Forces Japan
Ms. Joyce B. RABENS
Minister Counselor for Environment, Science, and Technology
Embassy of the United States of America, Tokyo 
Major James L. REYNOLDS, USA
Chief, Plans and Exercises Branch
18th Medical Command
United States Forces Korea
Lieutenant Colonel Jim RUVALCABA, USMC 
Theater Security Cooperation Officer
III Marine Expeditionary Force
Colonel Martha SANDERS, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Health Protection 18th Medical Command
United States Forces Korea
Ms. Mikako SANO
Science Affairs Analyst
Embassy of the United States of America, Tokyo 
Mr. James L. SCHOFF
Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Mr. Edward F. SMITH, Jr.
Institute for Defense Analyses
Special Assistant to PACOM Commander
United States Pacific Command
Dr. Ken STALEY, M.D.
Director for Biodefense Policy
White House Homeland Security Council
Lieutenant Colonel Clay SUTTON
Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J57
United States Pacific Command
Mr. Stephen E. THATCHER
Intelligence Operations Analyst
Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security
Lieutenant Colonel William A. THOMAS, Jr., M.D., FACP, USAF
Commander, 374th Aerospace Medicine Squadron, United States Forces Japan
Ms. Marina TRAVAYIAKIS
Research Associate
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Commander Michael VINEYARD, USN
Program Director
National Contingency Medical Preparedness
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, OSD
Lieutenant Colonel Scott WARNER, USA
Medical Plans Officer, J43
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The	following	table	identifies	select	international,	regional,	and	country	agencies	and	resources	with	
additional	information	on	avian	and	human	pandemic	influenza.	Not	all	organizations	focused	on	pan-
demic	influenza	are	represented	below.	
Organization Name: Website Address:
International / Regional Body
Asian Development Bank http://www.adb.org/BirdFlu/default.asp
APEC http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_
groups/health_task_force/apec_information_on.html
APEC – Emerging Infectious Network (EINet) http://depts.washington.edu/einet/home.html
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/dis-
eases-cards/special_avian.html
Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance (GAINS) http://www.gains.org/
Global Early Warning and Response System http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/new/2006/nw02/en/index.html
Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) http://www.gisaid.org/
Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/
OIE/FAO Network of Expertise on Avian Influenza (OFFLU) http://www.offlu.net/
World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTHEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/EXTTOPAVIFLU/
0,,menuPK:1793605~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1793593,00.
html
World Health Organization (WHO) http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/
WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/influenzanetwork/en/index.html
WHO Pandemic Preparedness http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic/en/
WHO Africa Region (AFRO) http://www.afro.who.int/csr/epr/avian_flu/index.html
WHO Region of the Americas (PAHO) http://www.paho.org/english/ad/dpc/cd/flu-avi.htm
WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMRO) http://www.emro.who.int/
WHO European Region (EURO) http://www.euro.who.int/flu
WHO Southeast Asia Region (SEARO) http://w3.whosea.org/en/Section10/Section1027.htm
WHO Western Pacific Region (WPRO) http://www.wpro.who.int/health_topics/avian_influenza/
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) http://www.oie.int/eng/AVIAN_INFLUENZA/home.htm
United Nations System Influenza Coordination (UNSIC) http://www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=1482
Japan
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/index.html
Infectious Disease Surveillance Center http://idsc.nih.go.jp/index.html
National Institute of Infectious Diseases  http://www.nih.go.jp/niid/index-e.html
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Republic of Korea
Korea Center for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) http://avian.cdc.go.kr (not available in English)
KCDC – Crisis Response Exercise for Pandemic Influenza http://exercise.cdc.go.kr
United States
Department of Defense – Global Emerging Infections 
Surveillance and Response System (DoD-GEIS)
http://www.geis.fhp.osd.mil/
DoD – Deployment Health Support http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/
Department of Health and Human Services http://www.pandemicflu.gov/
http://www.avianflu.gov/
National Institutes of Health http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/focuson/flu
USAID – Avian Flu http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/home/
News/news_items/avian_influenza.html
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/
U.S. Pacific Command – Avian Flu http://www.pacom.mil/special/avianflu05/index.shtml
U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/g/avianflu/
The White House – Pandemic Flu http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu/The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
675 Massachusetts Avenue
10th Floor
cambridge, MA 02139
telephone: (617) 492-2116
Fax: (617) 492-8242
1725 Desales street, NW
suite 402
Washington, Dc 20036
telephone: (202) 463-7942
Fax: (202) 785-2785
email: mail@ifpa.org
httP://WWW.IFPA.oRg/
Copyright©2006 The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.